The Poison of Philosophy 287
things about which the prophets received revelation – such as God, the
Day of Judgment, the afterlife, and bodily resurrection – do not cor-
respond to the truth, but have to be believed by the common people
for their welfare. Among these he counts Sevener Shiites (al-Bāṭiniyya
kal-malāḥida al-ismāʿīliyya wa-aṣḥāb rasāʾil ikhwān al-ṣafāʾ), al-Fārābī
(d. 339/950), Ibn Sīnā, al-Suhrawardī al-Maqtūl (d. 587/1191), Ibn
Rushd (d. 595/1198) and “the heretic Sufis who left the path of their
forerunners among the Sunnis”, like Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 638/1240), Ibn
Sabʿīn (d. 669/1270), Ibn Ṭufayl (d. 581/1185), “and many others.”^143
He considers all of them bāṭinīs – that is, “esotericists” – since they
distinguish between the outward meaning of the revelation (ẓāhir), as
it is to be understood by the common people, and its inward mean-
ing (bāṭin) that is preserved for themselves.^144 Nevertheless, he dis-
tinguishes among them in regard to their positioning of the prophets
above or beneath outstanding scholars. He cites Ibn Sīnā as an example
of those who propagate that the prophets have more knowledge than
the philosophers, since they know how to address the common people
and to disguise the truth for their sake. As examples of those who hold
that the prophets are inferior, he mentions Ibn (al-)ʿArabī as holding
that the Sufi masters excel them and al-Fārābī and Mubashshir b. Fātik
(fifth/eleventh century) as proclaiming that the philosophers have a
better knowledge of the truth than the prophets.^145
The second group, “the people of distortion and interpretation”
(I. 2), he characterizes as people who believe that the words of the
prophets represent the truth but at the same time are convinced that
truth is what reason tells us. As such, these people attempt to inter-
143 Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql, vol. 1, pp. 8–11.
144 Ibid., vol. 6, p. 237 (here, he speaks of Bāṭiniyyat al-falāsifa); for applications
of the term to other groups, see Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql, vol. 11, s. v. Bāṭiniyya and
its composita.
145 Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql, vol. 1, pp. 9–10. See Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ
taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql, vol. 5, pp. 359–363. Concerning al-Fārābī’s theory about the
position and the duties of the prophets and the philosopher king, which Ibn
Taymiyya alters, see al-Fārābī, On the Perfect State, pp. 221–227, 421–423;
see, however, Michot, who approves of Ibn Taymiyya’s reading (Lettre à Abū
l-Fidāʾ, p. 23). Mubashshir b. Fātik is especially known for a collection of wis-
dom of ancient Greek sages (Rosenthal, Franz: al-Mubashshir b. Fātik, in: EI^2 ,
vol. 7 (1993), pp. 282–283). As to Ibn ʿArabī’s comprehension of prophecy
and the “perfect man”, which Ibn Taymiyya also distorts, see Chodkiewicz,
Michel: Le sceau des saints. Prophétie et sainteté dans la doctrine d’Ibn Arabî,
Paris 1986.
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