294 Anke von Kügelgen
What he rebuts is thus the “real definition” (ḥadd ḥaqīqī) of the logi-
cians by which they claim to grasp the “essence” of a thing^174 and thus
its genus, species, and difference. One of his examples is their com-
mon definition of man as a “rational animal,” maintaining that “ratio-
nal” constitutes the difference (faṣl) marking the species.^175 He argues
that the definition could just be “laughing animal,”^176 “laughing”
being characterized by the logicians only as a proprium (khāṣṣa).^177
In addition, “rational” would not, as the philosophers claim, consti-
tute a distinguishing essential attribute of a single species, because,
as philosophers themselves hold, “rationality” characterizes angels
and the supralunar intellects as well.^178 Ibn Taymiyya also points to
the circularity of the “real definition”.^179 With these examples, Ibn
Taymiyya wants to demonstrate the conventional character or the
relativity of “real definitions” and that, contrary to what the philoso-
phers claim, they cannot grasp the “essence” or “reality” of a species
or a genus.^180 Therefore, Ibn Taymiyya sees the “real definition” as
174 Robinson, Richard: Definition, Oxford 2003 (reprint), pp. 153–155.
175 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Radd, pp. 8, 70 et passim; al-Suyūṭī, Jahd al-qarīḥa, pp. 204,
216; Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya, pp. 7, n. 9, 26, n. 35. Porphyrius (Einleitung in
die Kategorien, in: Aristoteles: Organon, transl. and with notes by Eugen
Rolfes, Hamburg 1974, p. 3 (3b)) adds “mortal” and philosophers and later
kalām theologians follow him in that (Ibn Sīnā, al-Ishārāt wal-tanbīhāt, vol. 1,
p. 207; Avicenna, Remarks and Admonitions, p. 71). Ibn Taymiyya opposes
that “mortal” is an attribute of every living being, let alone that man’s life in
the hereafter is eternal (al-Radd, pp. 57–57).
176 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Radd, p. 67. See for instance Ibn Sīnā, al-Ishārāt wal-
tanbīhāt, vol. 1, pp. 210–212; Avicenna, Remarks and Admonitions, pp. 72–73.
177 It is noteworthy that the Moroccan scholar al-Ḥasan al-Yūsī who defended
logic against al-Suyūṭī’s repudiation (see above, chapter 5 and n. 165), wrote a
treatise entirely devoted to the distinction between the differentia specifica and
the proprium, entitled al-Qawl al-faṣl fī al-farq bayna al-khāṣṣa wal-faṣl (El-
Rouayheb, Was there a Revival, pp. 12–13; this seems not to have been edited
yet).
178 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Radd, p. 58. See van Ess, Josef: Die Erkenntnislehre des
Aḍud addīn al-Īcī. Übersetzung und Kommentar des ersten Buches seiner
Mawaqif, Wiesbaden 1966, p. 371.
179 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Radd, pp. 73–76, 10–11, 39–40, 59, 79–80; (much shortened
al-Suyūṭī, Jahd al-qarīḥa, pp. 205, 211, 217; Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya, pp. 9–10,
18, 29).
180 It is obvious from these examples that Ibn Taymiyya was not interested in
the questions the logicians dealt with when they established the differences
between “difference” and “proprium”, or correlating ones between “essen-
tial” (bil-dhāt) and “accidental” (bil-ʿaraḍ) or “essential” (dhātī) and “descrip-
tive” (waṣfī) with Aristotle’s modal syllogistic as their starting point. “Laugh-
Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological University
Authenticated