The Poison of Philosophy 307
the Muʿtazilīs and others, affirm the causes (al-asbāb) and say: ‘As the
connection (iqtirān) [between two things] is known as one to the other,
so it is known that there is in the fire a power (quwwa) that necessi-
tates (yaqtaḍī) burning, and in water a power that necessitates refresh-
ment. Likewise there is in the eye a power that necessitates sight and in
the tongue a power that necessitates taste.’ And they affirm the nature
(al-ṭabīʿa) that is called al-gharīza (the implanted disposition), al-naḥīza
(the natural disposition), al-khulq (the innate peculiarity), al-ʿāda (the
habit), and [that is given] other similar names.^231Ibn Taymiyya leaves no doubt that he adheres to the conviction of “the
majority of intelligent people.”^232 He thereby explicitly admits one of
the key theories of the Peripatetics, the theory of natural efficient cau-
sation, which, in contrast to his assertion, was far from having been
adopted by “the majority” to which he refers.^233 Seen in this light, his
231 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Radd, p. 94 (The additions in angular brackets are mine);
see Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql, vol. 9, pp. 339–342. In one passage, in
relation to the regular movements of the sun and the moon, Ibn Taymiyya
explicitly speaks of God’s custom (ʿāda), Ibn Taymiyya, al-Radd, p. 272.
232 Ibn Taymiyya confirms this in addition by several Koranic verses (2:164; 7:57;
50:9), al-Radd, p. 270; see the very similar argumentation in Ibn Taymiyya’s
major fatwa on astrology, where he explicitly states that God sets “radiance
and burning in the fire, purification and irrigation in the water, and the other
similar blessings that He mentions in His Book” and harshly rebuts those
kalām theologians who say “that God does these affairs with (ʿind) and not by
(bi-) them” (Michot, Ibn Taymiyya on Astrology, pp. 155–156) and validates it
also in Minhāj al-sunna and al-ʿAqīda al-tadmuriyya (Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s
Theodicy, pp. 147, 157–159). Henry Laoust pointed to the “Aristotelian spirit”
of Ibn Taymiyya “en s’efforçant de ‘raisonner comme raisonne la nature’ et
de pénétrer le secret des choses” (Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques,
pp. 167, 244–254). He refers to one of Ibn Taymiyya’s juridical tracts where
he speaks of the “essence”, the “quiddity” of the thing (māhiyyat al-shayʾ)
(Ibn Taymiyya, Kitāb al-Samāʿ wal-raqṣ, in: idem, Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil al-kubrā,
Cairo, vol. 2, p. 293). On the basis of several of Ibn Taymiyya’s writings, Nur-
cholis Madjid also showed that Ibn Taymiyya was no occasionalist. His main
interest, however, lies not in the logical implications, but in the differences
in metaphysics between Ibn Taymiyya and his opponents (Ibn Taymiyya on
Kalām and Falsafa, pp. 142–181). For the genesis and devolopment of occa-
sionalism in Islam, see Ulrich Rudolph and Dominik Perler: Occasionalismus.
Theorien der Kausalität im arabisch-islamischen und im europäischen Denken,
Göttingen 2000, pp. 23–124.
233 Ibn Taymiyya himself admits that “there are people who reject the forces
[al-quwā and the natures [ṭabāʾiʿ], as is the case with Abū al-Ḥasan [al-Ashʿarī]
and those who followed him, among the companions of Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī,
Aḥmad [b. Ḥanbal] and others” (Ibn Taymiyya, Fatwā on Human Reason in:
Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological University
Authenticated