The Poison of Philosophy 315
al-taʿlīl (causational inference), and its subdivisions, the co-extensive
analogy (qiyās al-ṭard) und the co-exclusive analogy (qiyās al-ʿaks).^261
Although he does not restrict its use to juridical questions in his refu-
tations of logic and the rationalists, he nevertheless exemplifies it with
a well-known case of co-extensive analogy from jurisprudence, which
he presents at the same time as a piece of evidence of the possibility
of converting it into the first figure of categorical syllogism. It is the
example of the inference from the revealed prohibition of wine from
grapes (khamr al-ʿinab) to wine from other fruits (nabīdh).^262 The
inference relies on their common factor (al-qadr al-mushtarak), i. e.,
their intoxicating nature, which constitutes the ratio legis (ʿilla, manāṭ,
jāmiʿ) in an analogy or the middle term (ḥadd awsaṭ) in a syllogism.^263
It can easily be given the form of a syllogism: “All inebriants are for-
bidden, wine from fruits other than grapes is an inebriant. Therefore,
242; see van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre, pp. 382–394, for a summary of the devo-
lopment of analogy in kalām theology.
261 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Radd, p. 371; al-Suyūṭī, Jahd al-qarīḥa, p. 332; Hallaq,
Ibn Taymiyya, p. 161; Ibn Taymiyya, Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad: Risālat al-Qiyās,
in: Risālatān fī Maʿnā al-qiyās li-shaykhay al-islām Ibn Taymiyya wa-Ibn al-
Qayyim, ed. by ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Maḥmūd ʿUmar, ʿAmmān 1407/1987, pp. 11–89,
here p. 14; Haqq, Sirajul: Ibn-Taimiyya’s Conception of Analogy and Consen-
sus, in: Islamic Culture 17 (1943), pp. 77–87; Jokisch, Benjamin: Islamisch-
es Recht in Theorie und Praxis. Analyse einiger kaufrechtlicher Fatwas von
Taqī’d-Dīn Aḥmad b. Taymiyya, Berlin 1996; Madjid, Ibn Taymiyya on Kalām
and Falsafa, pp. 106–111; Al-Matroudi, Abdul Hakim I.: The Ḥanbalī School
of Law and Ibn Taymiyyah. Conflict or Conciliation, London and New York
2006, pp. 72–74; Rapoport, Yossef: Ibn Taymiyya’s Radical Legal Thought.
Rationalism, Pluralism and the Primacy of Intention, in: Yossef Rapoport and
Shahab Ahmed (eds.): Ibn Taymiyya and His Times, Karachi 2010 (he elabo-
rates on qiyās and other juridical methods of Ibn Taymiyya, such as istiḥsān
and the judgment according to maṣlaḥa and mentions further studies on Ibn
Taymiyya’s legal thought; I thank him for providing me with his article when
it was in press).
262 In one passage in al-Radd (p. 116; al-Suyūṭī, Jahd al-qarīḥa, pp. 230–231;
Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya, pp. 44–45), Ibn Taymiyya does not explain nabīdh;
elsewhere, however, he does, subsuming in it the wine made from the grains
(ḥubūb) of wheat (ḥinṭa), barley (shaʿīr), rice (ruzz), or other things (al-Radd,
p. 372; in al-Suyūṭī’s abridgement, this clarification is missing; here he com-
pares simply khamr [without the specification al-ʿinab] with nabīdh). For the
usage of this inference in other of Ibn Taymiyya’s writings, see Hoover, Ibn
Taymiyya’s Theodicy, p. 57–58, n. 146. See also above, chapter 10.1.
263 Ibn Taymiyya uses the four terms (al-Radd, pp. 116, 212, 372; al-Suyūṭī, Jahd
al-qarīḥa, pp. 230, 300, 333, Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya, pp. 45, 127, 162); see below,
n. 274.
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