The Curse of Philosophy 351
“philosophical reason” was open to the philosophers – even to those
whom he considered enemies.^110
Of basic relevance for Ibn Taymiya’s project is his conception of
knowledge as a special relation between man and the world with no
other medium but universal notions, which are based on “real objects”.
Human knowledge is, thus, “a totally objective process which is deter-
mined by the essential epistemological factors which human reason cre-
ates through its relation with the world”, such as logic.^111 Knowledge
is a process which is limited to the realm of this world; it is rational in the
Aristotelian sense, stripped of metaphysics. This is the reason why Ibn
Taymiyya always asserts that knowledge has to be formulated through
meaningful expressions of real significance.^112Such a concept of knowledge does not play any role in man’s relation
to God, which is distinctively a religious relation based upon worship
“and the fulfillment of the religious laws conveyed by the Prophet
Muhammad, which have been formulated and fixed by the jurists
and the Hadith-scholars in reliance upon revelation.” Ibn Taymiyya,
so Ajhar, separates clearly between rational knowledge and religion;
“each one of the two has its own field and practices.”^113
In a critical hint, Ajhar states that Ibn Taymiyya’s emphasis on rea-
son and its agreement with the text of the Koran did not lead to the
revival of rational thought in Islam; on the contrary, it became com-
mon among Muslims to reject all forms of rational thinking in the
name of good religious tradition. Ibn Taymiyya contributed to this
negative development in Islamic intellectual history through his use
of “a double-leveled language” which attacked the philosophers and
theologians on one hand and adopted “the most daring philosophical
opinions in the history of Islamic thought” on the other. As such, his
discourse was “ambiguous” and difficult to understand.^114
Ajhar extensively presents Ibn Taymiyya’s philosophical views on
the topics which are addressed in the following chapters.
110 Ibid., pp. 21–22.
111 Ibid., p. 230.
112 Ibid., p. 231.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid., p. 23.
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