366 Georges Tamer
tion (sunna) in a way that illuminated the scientific-theoretical and the
practical-ethical dimensions of the “Islamic revolution”.
Al-Marzūqī asserts that this twofold endeavor, if fulfilled, could save
humanity from the “evils of globalism” (shurūr al-ʿawlama). Manifest-
ing through philosophical teachings which declared existence to be a
natural unity – as in the works of the Peripatetics and the Brethern of
Purity – or a historical unity – as in the works of Ibn ʿArabī and al-Rāzī –
the evil of globalism had already become visible in Ibn Taymiyya’s age.
According to al-Marzūqī, Ibn Taymiyya’s critical treatment of logic
and metaphysics located the origin of philosophical thought within an
endogenous Arabic-Islamic epistemological practice. Exceeding the
superficial opposition of philosophy and religion, this practice claimed
to establish the theoretical correspondence of “true religious tradition
and clear reason.” This was a reaction to the hermeneutical norm pre-
dominant in kalām and philosophy, which divided human knowledge
into esoteric and exoteric strata. On the contrary, “the Muhammedan
revolution” (al-thawra al-muḥammadiyya), by declaring Islam the
religion of human disposition (al-fiṭra) and elevating religious thought
to a universal state, abolished the contradiction between the natural
and the revealed religion: this stratification of knowledge was thus
rendered obsolete.^171 Through a “methodological revolution”, Ibn
Taymiyya was able to remove all accretions in order to reveal the real
harmony of clear reason and true religious tradition. His method led
to removing falsification (taḥrīf) from philosophy, as it eliminated the
“metaphysical absolutization” which made religious law appear to
contradict cosmological necessity. Ibn Taymiyya’s diagnosis of meta-
physics distinguishes between cosmological necessity and “religious
command” (al-amr al-sharʿī), ascribing to this the prerequisite of
human freedom, as the fulfillment of religious commands is based on
free choice.^172
Al-Marzūqī states, furthermore, that Ibn Taymiyya articulates his
critique of both philosophy and religious thought on A) an episte-
mological and B) an existential level. On the epistemological level, he
deals with the traditionally pretended opposition of analysis (taḥlīl)
and interpretation (taʾwīl) of objects of knowledge; on the existential
level, he deals with the traditionally pretended opposition of truth
171 Al-Marzūqī refers to Koran (7:172–173).
172 Al-Marzūqī, Fikr Ibn Taymiyya al-iṣlāḥī, http://www.alfalsafa.com/fikr ibn
taymia.html, accessed on August 16, 2011.
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