Law and Order According to Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 413
the traditions that the first caliphs killed some people to set an example.
If nothing else had happened but that the caliph ʿUthmān (d. 35/656)
burned the Koranic manuscripts (which were widespread but different in
some features from the authorised one), that in itself is (a good example
of) the realisation of views based on the interests of the community.^58This debate illustrates the two opposing viewpoints of the experts on
religious law on the relationship between politics and Sharia: the first
accepts the compromises made with the rulers’ politics, as long as they
serve a common good that is recognisable from the point of view of
the Sharia; according to the other viewpoint, the politics of ruling is
in opposition to the politics of religious law. Therefore, Sharia is per-
fect and does not need any external legitimacy or effectiveness. One
can consider the first current of ideas as pragmatic in the sense that
the jurists recognize the important role rulership plays in shaping the
public order.
Other juridical schools, seemingly facing the same challenge, devel-
oped the traditional principle of necessity (ḍarūra) whereas others
theorized public interest (maṣlaḥa).^59 Nevertheless, these secondary
and contested sources of legal judgements and procedures did not
seem sufficient to maintain Sharia as the main source of authority for
the policies adopted by Mamluk rulers. Therefore, the scope of siyāsa
sharʿiyya had to be much broader than that of maṣlaḥa or ḍarūra. On
the one hand, it seeks to justify the coercive public policy adopted by
Muslim rulers. On the other, it makes any similar procedure or prin-
ciple, by way of extension, a part of Sharia.
Pursuing this further, Ibn Taymiyya attempts to justify coercive
public policy by stating that political authority is a duty.^60 He uses
mostly a textual reasoning from which he concludes that the author-
58 Ibid.
59 Similarly, Antony Black noticed the response of the Twerlver Shiism to the same
challenge when “the Old Twelver view allowed only the imam himself to use
coercive force, al-Karakī extended this to the Mujtahid, qua Deputy, when he
was delivering judgment and imposing Legal Penalties”; Black, Antony: The
History of Islamic Political Thought. From the Prophet to the Present, New
York 2001, p. 229. On ḍarūra see Krawietz, Birgit: Ḍarūra in Modern Islamic
Law. The Case of Organ Transplantation, in: Robert Gleave and Eugenia Ker-
meli (eds.): Islamic Law. Theory and Practice, London and New York 1997,
pp. 185–193. On maṣlaḥa see Opwis, Felicitas Meta Maria: Maṣlaḥa and the
Purpose of the Law. Islamic Discourse on Legal Change from the 4th/10th to
8 th/14th Century, Leiden and Boston 2010.
60 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Siyāsa al-sharʿiyya, p. 232.
Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological University
Authenticated