Law and Order According to Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 415
(adab al-qāḍī). Thus, Ibn al-Qayyim’s book covers mainly the tradi-
tional judicial themes discussed by Ḥanafī jurists. Nevertheless, he dif-
fers in that he defends a more pro-active role for the judge. Notably,
he authorises judges to use torture “in order to obtain confession that
indicates the location of the stolen things whose existence can convict
the suspected person”.^67 If the stolen goods, he goes on to say, “are
not in the place indicated by the suspect, the victim has the right to
ask the judge to beat the thief until he leads to the rest of the stolen
things”.^68 If the suspect has the money but hides it somewhere, the
general rule is to beat him. If he denies the accusation, then he should
be beaten undoubtedly to force him to recognize his responsibility. Ibn
al-Qayyim justifies beating a thief by asserting that the suspect has the
duty to give back the money.^69 Similarly, someone who refuses to carry
out his financial responsibilities could be beaten. Ibn al-Qayyim relies
on the consensus of the jurists to justify physical punishment until the
accused can pay.^70 Indeed, Ibn al-Qayyim is concerned with the out-
comes of an inefficient public order. To make sure that the justice of
Sharia is applied, the judges have full authority to solve cases. Inciden-
tally, Ibn al-Qayyim touches on the subject of politics. He points out
that the reason some rulers dare to show disrespect for Islamic law is
the ignorance of certain jurists. The latter think that the scope of Sharia
does not go beyond what is revealed in the Koran and Sunna. By doing
so, the jurists encourage the political authorities to take recourse to
non-Islamic measures in order to be effective in their political rule. At
this point, Ibn al-Qayyim reminds the jurists that a just public policy
(siyāsa ʿādila) is a part of the spirit of Islamic law, in its indications
and its moral objectives. In like manner, Ibn al-Qayyim argues for the
coherence of law (sharīʿa) and public policy (siyāsa). Thus, he who has
a deep understanding of Sharia and knowledge of its completeness (and
of the fact that Sharia ensures the interests of people in this world and
in the hereafter) knows that just public policy is Sharia and does not
need any other public policy than what Sharia promotes. Remaining
strictly within the judicial realm of his analysis, he defines just public
67 Johansen, Baber: La découverte des choses qui parlent. La légalisation de la tor-
ture judiciaire en droit musulman (XIIIe–XIVe siècles), in: Enquête, anthropolo-
gie, histoire, sociologie 7 (1998), pp. 175–202, here p. 197. See also his discussion
of torture and “Trials of suspicion”, in: idem, Signs as Evidence, pp. 189–192.
68 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, al-Ṭuruq al-Ḥukmiyya, p. 287.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., p. 278.
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