Debating the Doctrine of jabr (Compulsion) 71
himself admits, while pointing out that ṭalāq al-sakrān is a specific
case, which does not apply to the general rule.
In the seventh section,^35 the Jabrī mocks the Muʿtazilī view, accord-
ing to which apostasy and ignorance are created by the human agent.
Is there an intelligent man who wants apostasy and ignorance for him-
self? He wonders and sums up: the human being commits both apos-
tasy and ignorance, but not out of his own choice and will. The Sunni
rejoins that that is indeed the case for many people, who, out of their
own stubbornness, evil intentions and hatred, wish for themselves to
be ignorant and apostates. Eight Koranic verses, describing the reluc-
tance of the apostates to accept the true message of Islam, corroborate
the Sunni’s claim.^36
In the eighth section,^37 a new argument is raised by the Jabrī in order
to negate the possibility of the efficacy of human power on the human
act: if human power affected the human act, it would affect any created
thing. The Sunni refutes this argument easily.
In the ninth and final section,^38 the Jabrī refines the statement in
which he started the dialogue: the proof of the existence of a sole Cre-
ator negates the possibility of the human being as an agent of his actions.
The Jabrī concludes that the “proof from reciprocal hindrance” (dalīl
al-tamānuʿ) proves his point. The Sunni refuses to accept this argu-
ment. He tries to make his point, but the irritated Jabrī refuses to listen.
The Jabrī and Sunni merely repeat their previous argumentations. The
dialogue concludes with the Sunni’s speech of victory, emphasizing his
view that the human being is indeed an efficacious agent of his actions.
All in all, the Jabrī makes 15 statements, most of which are relatively
short, while the Sunni’s answers are longer and more elaborated. Most
of the Jabrī’s arguments^39 rely on single textual proofs, without disclos-
35 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, pp. 335–336; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya,
Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, 1903, p. 149.
36 Koran (7:146; 41:17; 27:13–14; 29:38; 2:102; 2:90; 3:70–72).
37 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, p. 337; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ
al-ʿalīl, 1903, pp. 149–150.
38 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, pp. 337–341; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya,
Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, 1903, pp. 150–152.
39 Three of the Jabrī’s arguments are fairly long and detailed: his first “prepon-
derance without a preponderator” argument (Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ
al-ʿalīl, p. 319; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, 1903, p. 140), his argument
that the human act cannot be a maqdūr (an outcome of power) of two agents
(Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, pp. 327–328; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya,
Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, 1903, pp. 144–145) and his argument on the detailed knowledge
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