agriculture as far as possible and emphasizingflexibility.^7 Though the EU agreed to
cancel export subsidies, the EU required gradual reform.^8 Both sides gave tit for tat.
6.1.4 Summary
As a new member, China was less experienced in multilateral trade negotiations and
the capability of Chinese negotiators also needed to be further improved.^9 China
kept a low profile during the initial stage and mainly concentrated on fulfilling its
WTO commitments and studying trade rules; later, China gradually entered the
decision-making level of negotiations, and actively drove negotiations to yield fair
and balanced achievements and realize development goals.^10 Obviously, the EU
was unsatisfied with China’s performance. On the one hand, the EU welcomed
China’s participation in the negotiations and appreciated China’s roles; on the other
hand, the EU repeatedly encouraged China to add one“L”(Leadership) to the“4L”
strategy and override the preceding“4L”strategy by adding this“L”, and to
undertake an obligation for further freedom in negotiations, to“boldly play a
leading role”.
For several decades, the EU always served as one of the leaders in the multi-
lateral trade system. The rise of developing members in general during the new
period, changed the basic pattern characterized by the dominance of the EU and the
USA to some extent; furthermore, as Singapore issues were thwarted and interests
were limited, the EU had less desire to lead the Doha Round and only defined itself
as an active player.^11 However, overall, the EU still played a leading role in the
Doha Round. In previous trade policy reviews, China appreciated the leading role
of the EU and also called for more responsibilities on the part of the EU, especially
more concessions in the agriculturalfield so that the EU made more contributions to
the healthy operation of the multilateral trade system.
The Doha Round of trade negotiations and the global climate change negotia-
tions are two of the most important global negotiations in the current global gov-
ernancefield. The Doha Round of trade negotiations, originally scheduled to be
completed by the end of 2004, was still at a deadlock then. Impasse in negotiations
resulted from failure to make concessions between the USA and India with respect
to the special safeguard mechanism for agricultural products, which was funda-
mentally attributable to the exorbitantly high requirements demanded by the USA
for access to the market on the part of non-agricultural products. In fact, although
the Doha Round was often discussed at the China-EU Summit, at high-level
(^7) Zhang and Wang ( 2012 ).
(^8) Sun ( 2005 ).
(^9) See Sun ( 2008 ).
(^10) The Chinese Ministry of Commerce ( 2010 ).
(^11) In contrast, the EU defined itself as a driving force and a leader in global climate negotiations.
122 L. Heng