than simply outsmarting Hood. He felt
that from Atlanta he could march to the
sea and rip out the heart of the Confeder-
acy. The march would create a dead zone
that split the Confederacy in two. By
marching through Georgia, Sherman felt
he could strike a blow to Confederate
morale from which the South could not
recover. Sherman was greatly amused by
Jefferson Davis’s grand proclamations in
the aftermath of the Atlanta campaign. “I
am convinced the best results will follow
from out defeating Jeff. Davis’s cherished
plan of making me leave Georgia by
maneuvering,” he told Grant. The chance
to embarrass the Confederate president
was too great to resist.
His correspondence with Grant was the
first part of Sherman’s planned campaign
to convince Grant and the Lincoln admin-
istration in Washington to approve his
march to the sea. Grant initially was
skeptical. He had his own issues to worry
about. In Virginia he was opposite Robert
E. Lee at Petersburg, after having fought
three battles, losing two of them, and tak-
ing 100,000 casualties in the process.Grant’s reputation had never really recov-
ered from this phase of the war. The pub-
lic was outraged at the heavy effusion of
blood. Sherman’s taking of Atlanta in
September saved not only Grant but
Abraham Lincoln’s flagging reelection
campaign.
Even as he telegraphed Grant on Octo-
ber 10 with his idea of moving east to the
sea, Sherman was already making prepa-
rations. He trimmed his army of unneces-
sary personnel and equipment, sending
them back to his base at Chattanooga.
Sherman then assigned the department’s
chief quartermaster to oversee the repair
of rails along the Chattanooga-Atlanta
line. To secure the line he dispatched Maj.
Gen. George H. Thomas and the IV Corps
to garrison the key towns of Nashville,
Chattanooga, and Decatur, Georgia.
During this time, Hood remained in a
position to harass Sherman’s communica-
tions, while Forrest executed a daring river
raid in western Tennessee in which he cap-
tured or sank several Union supply ships.
Sherman telegraphed the full details of For-
rest’s raid and Hood’s current position and
once again made his case for an expedition
to the sea. Grant, never afraid to bring
about a major battle, replied that he
thought since Hood was easily located in
his north, this was the time and place forSherman to attack and remove Hood’s men-
ace once and for all. “If you can see a
chance of destroying Hood’s army, attend to
that first, and make your other move sec-
ondary,” Grant advised. Sherman replied
that he believed he simply couldn’t catch up
to Hood, whose army was smaller and
leaner. Sherman pointed out that he had
“reduced baggage” and was prepared to
move in any direction, “but I regard the
pursuit of Hood as useless.” Sherman
assured Grant that he was prepared to bat-
tle Hood if necessary, but as long as he was
forced to hold on to Atlanta, “my force will
not be equal to this.”
On November 2, Grant finally
telegraphed Sherman saying in part, “I do
not see that you can withdraw from where
you are to follow Hood without giving up
all we have gained in territory. I say then,
go on as you propose.” A few days later,
Sherman sent Grant his formal plan of
march. Grant replied on November 7, “I
see no reason for changing your plan.
Should any arise, you will see it, or if I do
I will inform you.”
In a later communication to Maj. Gen.
Henry W. Halleck, Sherman articulated his
thinking and grand strategy. “I attach
more importance to these deep incursions
into the enemy’s country,” he wrote. Sher-
man said that the war in America differedWith Atlanta in flames behind them, Sherman’s
XIV and XX Corps march south. Each man carried
a musket, 40 rounds of ammunition, a tin cup,
and a haversack. The rest they would scavenge
along the way.CWQ-Sum16 Sherman's March_Layout 1 4/20/16 4:40 PM Page 68