sparred and skirmished, a major con-
frontation in the vicinity of Murfreesboro
became all but inevitable. By the evening of
December 27, Bragg had concentrated the
bulk his army at the town, divided into two
corps. On the right was the corps led by Lt.
Gen. William Hardee. A career officer and
author of a widely used tactics manual,
Hardee initially had enjoyed good relations
with Bragg, but their relationship was sour-
ing rapidly. On Bragg’s left was the corps
commanded by Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk, a
seemingly competent West Pointer who had
opted for the Episcopal ministry and was
serving at the outbreak of the war as the
Bishop of Louisiana. Despite the pacific
nature of his profession, Polk’s disagree-
ments with Bragg had degenerated into a
bitter personal feud.
Such squabbling didn’t bode well with a
major fight in the offing. By December 30,
both armies had moved into position
northwest of Murfreesboro; a good por-
tion of Confederate forces were deployed
west of Stones River. Hardee, who consid-
ered himself an expert on such matters, wasexasperated by the dispositions. Stones
River, he warned, could be easily forded by
an enemy flanking party, and the rugged
ground west of the river was decidedly
unsuitable for maneuvering large bodies of
infantry. “The open fields beyond town are
fringed with dense cedar brakes,” wrote
Hardee, “offering excellent shelter for
approaching infantry, and are almost
impervious to artillery.”
The forbidding nature of the ground
failed to dissuade either army commander.
For his part, Rosecrans drafted an ambi-
tious battle plan. He expected to receive an
attack on McCook’s right wing and
directed the Ohioan to simply tie up Con-
federate forces in the coming action. “Take
a strong position,” ordered Rosecrans, “if
the enemy attacks you, fall back slowly,
refusing your right, contesting the ground
inch by inch.” While McCook maintained
his ground, Crittenden was to make the pri-
mary effort. Supported by Thomas, Crit-
tenden was to cross Stones River, assail the
Confederate right, and drive hard for
Murfreesboro in the enemy’s rear. If allwent well, asserted a confident Rosecrans,
the Rebel line of retreat would be seized,
“probably destroying their army.”
The Confederates were unlikely to sim-
ply await such a development. Coinciden-
tally, Bragg had outlined a remarkably sim-
ilar plan, intending to implement a grand
turning movement against Rosecrans’s
right. The prickly commander planned to
execute a devastating right wheel into
Rosecrans’s flank and roll up the Federal
line en echelonfrom left to right, driving
the enemy into Stones River and seizing the
Nashville Pike, Rosecrans’s only viable
avenue of retreat and resupply.
Bragg’s selection of the attack’s spearhead
was a curious one. The lead division was
that of Maj. Gen. John McCown, an offi-
cer whom Bragg held in little esteem; the
Tennessean, in Bragg’s opinion, lacked the
requisite capacity and nerve for weighty
assignments. McCown’s supporting divi-
sion, led by Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne,
was in better hands. Cleburne, an Irish
immigrant and British Army veteran, had
started the war as a private soldier butCWQ-Sum16 Stones River_Layout 1 4/20/16 4:45 PM Page 85