failed to return the favor once received. This requirement limits the chances of
reciprocal altruism in large groups, where it is impossible to keep track of
mutual favors. Further, reciprocal altruism does not necessarily mean that the
original recipient returns a favor to the original altruist. Helping someone and
then being helped by someone else is made possible byreputation manage-
ment: in small-scale societies (and friendship networks), an individual’s record
as a reliable cooperation partner is an important asset that can directly
increase one’sfitness (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005).
The question can be raised as to how wefind psychological traits worth
studying that are relevant for understanding morality. A possible way to
examine psychological traits is to ask what they do for the individual, espe-
cially if we consider the conditions in which the particular trait evolved.
Arguably, evolution equipped us with morally relevant traits that addressed
some aspects of our lives in ancestral conditions. Evolutionary psychologists
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby proposed that the human cognitive architec-
ture consists of a number of context-specific modules, including a number of
modules that serve social interaction. They suggested that
[d]istinct and incommensurable evolved motivational principles exist for food,
sexual attraction, parenting, kinship, incest avoidance, coalitions, disease avoid-
ance, friendship, predators, provocations, snakes, spiders, habitats, safety, com-
petitors, being observed, behavior when sick, certain categories of moral
transgression, and scores of other entities, conditions, acts, and relationships.
(Tooby & Cosmides, 2016, p. 55)Therefore, evolved specializations inthe human mind (mental modules) must
exist for such contexts (Tooby & Cosmides, 2016, pp. 54–5; cf. Cosmides &
Tooby, 1987, 1994; Tooby & Cosmides, 2000; Tooby et al., 2005).
Drawing on the tradition of evolutionary psychology, Pascal Boyer (2002,
pp. 192–231) inquired about the connection between morality and religion.
He focused especially on the role of moral emotions. The starting point of
Boyer’s argument is the model of moralistic punishment, developed by Robert
Trivers (1971) (in connection with his theory of reciprocal altruism, see
section 2.2.7). In addition to looking out for cheaters, people are irrationally
outraged when they discover cheating and go to extremes to punish cheaters
even if they occur costs themselves. On top of that, people are outraged if
someone fails to stand up against cheating. Such expected emotional reactions
make cheating very risky and facilitate honest cooperative behavior in society.
Other emotional mechanisms are also involved in cooperative behavior: guilt
serves as a punishment for dishonesty that we ourselves commit and gratitude
as well as pride are emotional rewards for being honest. As we will see later,
however, all of these pro-social emotions are counterbalanced by various
contextual factors: people who subscribe to moral standards still wage wars
and take advantage of strangers.
174 Cognitive Science and the New Testament