12 THE PREM ERATHE MANAGERS
SUMMER 2011: As Alex Ferguson approaches 25 years as manager
of Manchester United, Jonathan Wilson argues that the Scot’s tactical
evolution has been key to his success and longevity at Old TraffordAdapt and thrive
T
he great Hungarian coach
Bela Guttmann was hugely
successful during his career
in South America and Europe,
leading Benfica to two European Cups,
but he was always adamant that “the
third season is fatal”. Beyond that, he
felt, he could no longer motivate players;
they had seen all his tricks and he had
run out of ways to surprise opponents.
On the spectrum of coaches,
Guttmann stands at one end as a
shock merchant, somebody who came
in, rattled cages, shook things up and- sometimes – prompted spurts of
success. In terms of a modern
equivalent, a coach who is always
wandering, winning trophies across
a range of countries, the closest
comparison isJose Mourinho.
At the other end of the scale are
the likes of Alex Ferguson, Guy Roux
and Valeriy Lobanovskyi, the empire-
builders who measure their tenures
not in years but in decades. Their
achievement is not just their stamina,
but also in their ability to adapt, to live
out a constant process of evolution.
Just how difficult that can be is
perhaps best seen in those who have
failed to change. Look, for instance,
at Brian Clough, who was a far more
astute tactician than he was often given
credit for – as Nottingham Forest’s use
of a five-man midfield against Hamburg
in the1980 European Cup final attests.
Through the1980s and early1990s he
did an astonishing job to keep Forest
competitive despite limited resources,
but ill health caught up with him and in
the end he was exposed. His preferred
mode was 4-4-2 with a wide midfielder
advanced and the other tucked in, and
he would not countenance change.
Forest’s relegation and Clough’s
retirement came in the first season of
the Premier League, which was also
the year that Ferguson, in his seventh
season at Manchester United, won
his first English league title.The tactical shape was little
different then to how United play
now – essentially a 4-4-2 with split
strikers – but the style has undergone
a series of vital reinterpretations.
When Lobanovskyi died in 2002,
Dynamo Kyiv seemed hamstrung as a
series of coaches – all of which, untilthe arrival of Yuri Semin, were former
Lobanovskyi players – seemed intent on
trying to second guess what “The Colonel”
would have done. But what Lobanovskyi
would have done was to adapt.
United’s subtle changes are a case in
point and also exemplify the importance
of what Ferguson has referred to as
“managing change.”
A generation of players cannot be
allowed to grow old together without
replacements emerging – something that
prevents Guttmann’s three-year issue. Do
not change the coach, change the players.
The reason for Leeds United’s collapse
after Don Revie left in1974, for instance,was that the players had played together
for the best part of a decade.
Ferguson, though, has always been
ruthless. After United finished second in
the league and lost the FA Cup final in
1995, he sold Mark Hughes, Paul Ince
and Andrei Kanchelskis. After defeat by
Real Madrid in the Champions LeagueUnited’s subtle changes are a case in
point and also exemplify the importance
ofwhatFergusonhasreferredtoas
“managingchange”
Manchester United 2 v1 Barcelona -15.05.91 Cup-winners Cup Final Juventus 2 v 3 Manchester United - 21.04.99 Champions League semi-final second legSplit strikers...a regular Ferguson feature, here with Irwin and Sharpe providing the width Midfield strength...Ferguson used two ball-winning midfielders in Keane and Butt