Socrates tests Laches’understanding of courage as wise endurance by presenting him with a
choice. On the one hand, courage can be understood as choosing to fight“based on a wise cal-
culation”when one’s position is stronger and“fighting men who are fewer than those on his side,
and inferior to them:::”(193a). On the other hand, courage could be displayed by one“who is
willing to remain and hold out”(193a). In selecting the second option, Laches reveals his lack of
harmony and its source in his lack of understanding. Previously, they had agreed that foolish daring
and endurance were disgraceful and harmful (see 192c–d, 193d). Now, Laches argues the contrary.
Fortunately, Laches recognizes that they are not making sense because“their deeds are not har-
monized with their words”(193e). What he does not recognize is the source of this disharmony.
The reader, however, is aware that the source lies in Laches’resistance to knowledge or phil-
osophy. It was previously shown that Laches would willingly forego philosophic discussion in
favor of attending to the affairs of the city. That Laches is never able to reconcile politics and
philosophy is suggested by the qualification he adds to his definition of courage as endurance of the
soul:“if it is necessary to say what its nature is in all cases”(192b). Socrates must once again keep
Laches in the conversation if they are going to answer the question. He does this by encouraging
Laches to act in accordance with his definition of courage as wise endurance and wants both of them
to hold their“ground in the search and let us endure, so that courage itself won’t make fun of us for
searching for it courageously:::”(194a). Whereas Laches decides to remain in the conversation,
he does so for political reasons. What ultimately matters for Laches is the“absolute desire for
victory”of the politician and not the steadfast endurance, or courage, of the philosopher in the face
ofaporia(194a).
Socrates and Nicias
Unlike Laches, Nicias is open to knowledge as suggested by his attempt to correct for Socrates’
inability to arrive at a definition of courage with Laches. According to Nicias, Socrates is not
“defining courage in the right way”because he is ignoring his own opinion on the subject matter
(194c). In particular, Nicias adopts the position of Socrates that“everyone one of us is good
with respect to that which he is wise and bad in respect to that which he is ignorant”(194d). Here,
Nicias reasons like a sophist by providing a short, high-minded answer from another that speaks
to Nicias’cleverness rather than his own understanding of courage. Arguing this way differentiates
Nicias from Laches. Whereas Laches is willing to begin with his own opinion, Nicias is not. Nicias’
reliance on the opinion of another reinforces the conclusion that politics is not the sole obstacle to
knowledge dealt with in the dialog. As suggested in the reading of the first half of theLaches
provided above and reiterated below, Socrates must also address the tension between rival con-
ceptions of philosophy. It is necessary for him to do so as an improper view of education prevents
one from pursuing the proper object of inquiry in the right way.
Nicias initially defines courage in this way:“if a courageous man is really good, it is clear that he
is wise”(194d). What is important here is not the actual definition, but the fact that Nicias will be
shown to have no idea what he is talking about. His definition has the appearance of knowledge, but
only the appearance, and it is up to Socrates to reveal this to Nicias. He begins to do this by asking
Nicias to clarify what type of knowledge courage consists of (194e). Nicias responds that courage
consists of knowledge of what is fearful and hopeful in war and in every other station, but closer
examination reveals that Nicias really understands courage to consist of knowledge of future goods
and evils (195a).
Laches is the first to recognize this when he connects Nicias’definition of courage to knowledge
of for whom it is better to live or die (195e). In recognition of this, Laches claims that Nicias equates
seers with the knowledge of courage which allows him to identify a series of problems with Nicias’
view of knowledge. First, only a god could possess such knowledge (196a). Second, and more
importantly, Nicias twists his argument to avoid contradicting himself (196b). Laches concludes
102 Jordon B. Barkalow