Socrates is asking for the idea or form of virtue itself.^10 Socrates’refutation, therefore, will flow from
Meno’s inability to say what the idea of virtue is as opposed to its many particular examples.
Meno initially responds to Socrates’request for the idea of virtue with the claim that virtue is not
like this. Although there are particular virtues, there is no common characteristic to unite them all or
to cohere them into a single definition. Yet, with Socrates’encouragement, Meno attempts for the
second time to say what virtue is according to the standard that Socrates has set. Meno’s second
definition of virtue is the ability“to rule over people”(Meno, 73d). Socrates’refutation of this
definition again has to do not with the content of the definition, but the form or structure in which it
is given. Socrates asks if the virtue of a child or a slave is to rule over the parent or the master. Meno
answers in the negative, with the implication that ruling is not then the common characteristic that
all the virtues share. Again, Meno has given a particular example rather than the idea.
Moreover, remaining with the concept of rule, Meno confirms in response to Socrates’question
that virtuous rule requires ruling justly rather than unjustly because, according to Meno,“justice is
virtue”(73d–e). Ruling as the definition of virtue, is thereby transformed into justice, and Socrates
asks if justice is virtue itself, or one among many virtues. Meno answers that justice is one among
many virtues, including courage, moderation, and magnificence. Socrates thus points out that
Meno again has given a particular example of virtue–justice–rather than its idea (73e–74b).
Having failed in his second attempt to define virtue, Meno asks Socrates for further clarification
of what he wants when he asks for the nature of virtue or the common characteristic that all the
virtues share. Socrates further illustrates what he means by the nature or idea of a thing with the
examples of shape and color. Although there may be many different shapes, such as circle, square,
triangle, and others, the nature or idea of shape is that characteristic that is the same for all of these
different shapes and allows us to call them shapes. Shape so understood, according to Socrates,“is
that which alone of existing things always follows color”(75c). Socrates appears to mean that shape
is what allows color to be seen or manifest itself.
For example, the color red does not manifest itself as abstract particles floating formless through
the air, but rather it always manifests itself in particular shapes formed by objects such as lips,
apples, roses, and others. All these objects have very different shapes, but they all allow us to see the
color red. In response to Meno’s question,“if someone were to say that he did not know what color
is, [:::] what do you think your answer would be?,”Socrates gives a second definition of shape
(75c). Is Socrates conceding that there is no common characteristic or single definition for shape,
just as Meno had claimed about virtue? Nonetheless, Socrates’second definition of shape is“the
limit of a solid”(76a). Shape is thus a boundary to matter, which appears to mean that like color, we
never see abstract particles of matter floating formless through the air, but matter always manifests
itself in particular shapes, such as lips, apples, and roses.
That shape is what allows color and matter to be seen is illustrated in Socrates’definition of the
nature or idea of color. According to Socrates,“color is an effluvium from shapes which fits the sight
and is perceived”(76d).“Effluvium”isaflowingoutoranoutflowintheformofastreamofparticles.
Color, for Socrates, is thus an outflow from shapes that is then perceived by sight. Shape, therefore,
unitingSocrates’two definitions, is what allows color and matter to manifest themselves, and thus in a
sense allows color and matter to be color and matter, or what they are according to the perceiver.
So understood, virtue will be like shape, or the idea of things in the material world will be
matched by the idea of virtue in the non-material world, as Socrates will define it. Thus, Socrates
later in the dialog will eventually hypothesize that,“virtue, being beneficial, must be a kind of
wisdom”(88d). The hypothesis that virtue is wisdom results from Socrates’reasoningthat par-
ticular things that we take as virtues–moderation, justice, courage, and magnificence–if not
guided by wisdom in the soul can actually turn into vices (88a–d). Thus, wisdom allows particular
virtues to be virtues rather than vices. As shape allows color and matter to manifest themselves and
hence be what they are, so wisdom allows virtue to manifest itself or be what it is; wisdom is the
necessary condition for virtue to appear and the common characteristic that all the virtues share.
Skepticism and Recollection in Socrates 51