and readerly aspects of the speech-act into something of a truly “higher
order”—for one thing, it begins with the phenomenon of consciousness,
which is a given, whereas an analogous application of this argument to
meaning has no such given from which to proceed. Spinks also fails to
recognize that the competing “theories” of meaning that he engages are
really only alternative defi nitions of meaning, and that their difference as
alternative defi nitions merely represents the choices one makes in con-
structing sentences.
A similar view of meaning can be found in Pol Vandevelde’s discussion
of “the task of the interpreter.” Vandevelde defends the role of autho-
rial intention against Hans-Georg Gadamer’s dismissal: “[I]f interpreters
claim validity for an interpretation, they have to make clear to others what
the object of interpretation is, and, in the case of texts, they can only
defi ne or identify the object by using the author.” 22 Following from this,
Vandevelde correctly recognizes that the intention is the very reason the
text exists: “When an intention permeates an object, as in the case of
a text in the narrow sense of a written document, the intention is part
of the defi nition of the object.” 23 For some reason, however, he thinks
something more is needed, and he proceeds to treat intention merely as
one “level” of meaning—a level (according to him) ideally to be com-
bined with others. Vandevelde treats the existence of these “levels” as a
given, not even considering that the difference between them might be
defi nitional rather than aspectual, and he even compares the multiplicity
of intention, text, and readerly event with the multiple levels of scriptural
meaning posited by medieval theologians. 24 This eventually leads him to
redefi ne the “author” who matters as the reconstructed “author,” and to
locate “meaning” in the reading event: “Only from the interpretation of
the work can meaning arise; and only in interpretation can this meaning
be referred to and attributed to its author.” 25 Thus Vandevelde exhibits
a fundamental confusion between recognizing the three principals in the
event of interpretation (author, text, reader), and pinpointing the proper
object of interpretation.
Another critic who depicts meaning as an amalgam of authorial and
readerly moments is Merold Westphal. According to Westphal, “author
and reader are cocreators of textual meaning.” 26 He emphatically rejects
Hirsch’s intentionalist hermeneutic as something neither “possible or even
desirable.” 27 In place of Hirsch’s singular focus on the author, Westphal
suggests that “the meaning(s) of a text [might] be coproduced by author
and reader, the product of their interaction.” 28 Westphal even compares
THERE IS NOTHING OUTSIDE THE INTENTION: ADDRESSING “MEANING”... 73