the Gadamerian conception of meaning (which he seems to support) with
the chemical makeup of water: “By designating water as H 2 O we dis-
tinguish the hydrogen from the oxygen. But if we were to separate the
two, we would no longer have water.” 29 This comparison suggests that
meaning is something that bridges or transcends the intersubjective space
between author and reader. No notice is made of the fact that this view
simply combines two competing meanings of “meaning” to arrive at a
single “one-size-fi ts-all” concept. The only reason for thinking that mean-
ing must be “one size fi ts all” is the supposition that separate meanings
of “meaning” must somehow represent co-existing intrasystemic forces or
addresses.
Within Pentecostal circles, the idea that meaning is a composite of
authorial and readerly moments has been articulated most clearly by
L. William Oliverio, Jr. Following Vandevelde’s argument for three sepa-
rate “levels” of meaning, Oliverio argues for a “both/and” position, in
connection with the “intentionalist versus constructivist” debate, over
against an “either/or” position. Oliverio sees in Vandevelde’s argument a
“much stronger account for ... hermeneutical realism” than the alterna-
tives of Hirsch or Gadamer. 30 Whether or not this is “realism,” it means
that Oliverio’s account is plagued by the same problems we found in
Vandevelde’s account—most notably, it mistakes competing defi nitions of
“meaning” for differing aspects (or “levels”) of a single given, turning
meaning into some sort of blob. This same confusion between defi nitions
and “levels” of meaning is also found in the sparsely argued thesis of fel-
low charismatic Clark H. Pinnock, who writes, “How do we know that
we have attained genuine meaning? I am not talking about attaining ‘the’
right meaning, because there is no one and only possible meaning. There
are levels of meaning and not a single one.” 31
I should probably pause to ensure that my references to a “blob” of
meaning are taken in the right way. I think the use of that word helpfully
emphasizes that the word “meaning” has taken on dimensions as unreal
as they are unwarranted, but I do not want my references to a “blob” to
distract from the actual lines of my argument. The problem with a blob-
like notion of “meaning” resides in its failure to recognize defi nitional
differences for what they are, and that it represents an expansion over
against those views of meaning that are backed by philosophical givens.
This brings me back to the Occamizing aspects of my argument. The point
of my referring to intending and understanding as cognitive events was to
highlight the fact that non-intentionalist textual meaning altogether lacks
this “event” character, and is lacking as well in any other sort of real-world
74 J.C. POIRIER