morality, also called‘the great law of justice’.^81 Through the whole
book, the quest for happiness and the need for morality appear as the
basic human motivations that make religion relevant. At times,
Spalding discusses their intimate connection with the primary
instinct for self-preservation as well as with Cicero’s idea ofsocietas
prima, the basic sociality of humans that he considers to come from
God.^82 However, well-being and morality are the basic facts relevant
for religion.
Spalding takes these ideas from his contemporaries, including not
only British thinkers and Herder but also Immanuel Kant. These
notions are not distinctive for Spalding as such, but their combin-
ations intended to make religion understandable for the Enlighten-
ment audience. Spalding considers that, to prove the relevance of
religion, one must bring it close to the issues of well-being and
morality:
To this discussion belongs, I think, the case ofreligion, as recognition
(Anerkennung)of the most perfect world-ruler(Weltregierer)in his
relationship to us. This concept inevitably and in this general form is
proper for naming religion. We will stick to this concept, which is in
itself capable of being thought; in addition, it provides the foundation
for all other extensions and conclusions derived from this knowledge
(Erkenntniss).^83For Spalding’s neology, the phrase‘in relationship to us’is important
because he is not concerned with revelation and dogmatics as such,
but with the appropriative and evidential dimension of religion, as
this dimension represents its relevant (angelegen) part. Spalding’s
study‘does not concern the foundation or non-foundation of this
faith, but only that importance and respect with which we regard it
and consider it as relevant, given that we assume it to be true’.^84
Spalding’s approach is thus equipped with epistemic constraints as he
contemplates the evidential manifestation of religion, a human know-
ledge that can be thought and rationally understood to be relevant.
Atfirst sight, the concept of recognition does not seem tofit well
into this framework. Why do we need to define religion as‘recogni-
tion’, instead of starting directly from the basic evidence provided by
the quest for well-being and morality? Fichte’s discussion may
(^81) Religion, 17, 31. (^82) Religion, 42, 46.
(^83) Religion, 24, italics in original. (^84) Religion, 25.
130 Recognition and Religion