The evidence gathered in Chapters 2 and 3 shows how this
procedure leads to a differentiated collection of historical examples.
This collection in turn enables the claim that the headwords display
numerous family resemblances that allow us to draw lines of historical
development. At the same time, we cannot speak of a homogeneous or
unified concept of recognition but a cluster of family resemblances that
highlight different aspects of this phenomenon.
To grasp these different aspects, a preliminary taxonomy of different
‘conceptions’of recognition was drafted in section 1.4. While each of
these conceptions employs a), b), and c) to an extent, they have
additional features as well, some of which can be distinguished when
we deconstruct the process of recognition into its elementary‘parts’
(see section 1.5). Such parts include the act of recognition, the horizon
of expectation, and the return of recognition. They also include
the content of recognition or the formulation‘as what’somebody is
recognized. For the analysis of historical texts, it is also useful to
distinguish among ‘upward’(U),‘downward’(D), and horizontal/
‘equal’(E) acts of recognition.
The significance of concrete acts of recognition is heavily
dependent on these parts and the conceptions built with them. In
other words, the parts and conceptions constitute the phenomenon of
recognition. Within the scope of this phenomenon, the distinctive
variants result from the different combinations of the parts. Let us
make this claim more immediate. Many standard conceptions of
recognition can be understood as immaterial gift transfers in which
the act of recognition imports the gift of attachment from A to B. An
‘upward’movement from A to B is nevertheless different from a
‘downward’movement. A gift transfer among equals represents a
third variant. While the concept of the gift assumes that A and
B are persons, the transfer need not be mutual. However, the actual
recognition can be preceded by expectation and followed by response,
thus we obtain several combinations of mutuality that are constituted
by different parts.
The content of recognition adds complexity to this picture. The most
dramatic variants of this content assume that the whole personal
identity of A or B changes as a result of the recognitive act. However,
this is by no means necessary; even a restricted change in knowledge or
attachment may count as recognition. Other qualifications can also
apply. In some cases, the performative act may be called‘recognition’
but the corresponding expectation is called something else, for
Recognition in Religion 185