different from monetary market exchange. As benefits are reciprocal,
they resemble economic exchange in some respects; Seneca’s philo-
sophical analysis is needed to teach precisely how the voluntary
exchange of favours nevertheless differs from economic exchange.^6
Griffin does not mention Marcel Hénaff (cf. section 1.2), but her hist-
orical view comes quite close to Hénaff’s anthropological elaborations.
For the present study, it is instructive to see that the classical
background of social history is not limited to friendship and patronage.
The acts ofagnoscoandrecognoscocannot be adequately described in
terms of friendship. While the Latin‘upward’recognition often alludes
to some kind of relationship between lord and servant, it needs to
be distinguished from patronage for the reasons that Griffingives:
recognition is a voluntary act that creates rather than assumes a
social structure. This‘performative’nature of recognition is typical of
conversion narrative, the promise of self-preservation, and existential
attachment. For this reason, religious recognition creates social status
and reality rather than adapting itself to it. Religious recognition does
not manifest an already existing social structure of patronage, although
the concepts of lord and servant are often employed.
Obviously, this does not mean that religious recognition is an
exchange of gifts or favours. Griffin pays attention to the perspective
of the giver; from this perspective, Seneca’sbeneficiumis a voluntary
favour. As favours ought to be returned, the perspective of the
recipient rather resembles a duty (officium).^7 It may be interesting
that the medieval theological texts (sections 2.3–2.4) on this differ-
ence of perspective describe upward recognition asbeneficium recog-
nosco. A divine being grants a benefit to humans who have a duty to
‘recognize’this benefit. In this sense, the upward recognition present
in Latin religious texts appears to be a proper response to the volun-
tary act of favour. This upward response is not, however, simply the
act of the client in the already existing system of patronage, but rather
an initial and constitutive duty that ratifies the bond offered in the
downward beneficial act of God.
What is the outcome of this act in terms of social reality? Griffin
considers that the person receiving the benefit becomes a friend
rather than a client.^8 A person who acknowledges God’s favour may
not become God’sfriendinasimilarsense,butneitheristhispersona
(^6) Griffin 2013, 41–2. (^7) Griffin 2013, 36, 45. (^8) Griffin 2013, 38.
202 Recognition and Religion