idea is relatively Augustinian in its emphasis on divine illumination,
Ficino’s emphasis on constitutive heteronomy is original.
Ficino usesagnoscofrequently, but the verb and the nounagnitio
are fairly close tocognoscoandcognitio, depicting knowledge in
general. Towards the end ofPlatonic Theology, Ficino discusses the
view that God has created souls so that they are prepared to obtain the
knowledge of divine goodness and love (divinae bonitatis agnitione
tum vel maxime amore parantur). If this is the case, then all minds
have the potential to know and love God (agnoscendi amandique
Dei). In this event, the divine light‘forms’the knowledge and love
‘reforms’(reformet) it so that it grasps the divine truth.^150
This passage may be considered as a parallel to the tasks of
recognitive knowledge inDe amore. In this context, Ficino speaks
of people who lack the light of reason. The Platonic view considers
that, when these souls are separated from the body in death, they will
receive the light and, through it,‘know God in creatures’(creatorem
in creaturis agnoscunt). Because of this, they will also receive the love
of God and become disposed towards glory.^151 In this manner,
knowledge and love also interact in the event of knowing God. This
is important for the understanding of Ficino in general; Kristeller,
for instance, argues that the love of God is primary in Ficino’s view
of love.^152
With regard to our study, Ficino’s most important conceptual
innovations concern recognition among equals, as elaborated in
De amore. Ficino builds on some elements that are available
in Augustine, Bernard, and Thomas, but he adds new ideas and
constructs the loving recognition as fundamentally horizontal and
mutual. Although Thomas has some elements of mutual horizontal
recognition (see section 2.4), Ficino can be considered as thefirst
thinker to have developed an essentially horizontal conception of
recognition. The distinction between more and less beautiful lovers
means that some aspects of downward/equal recognition belong to
this account, but basically he aims at mutual and equal recognition.
Another innovative aspect concerns Ficino’s radical understanding
of self-recognition and identity constitution. While some earlier texts
(e.g.Recognitions) speak of conversion and massive cognitive change,
(^150) Theol. Plat.XVIII, 11. Trans. Hankins (2006), 210–13.
(^151) Theol. Plat.XVIII. Trans. Hankins (2006), 212–13.
(^152) Kristeller 1972, 262–3.
86 Recognition and Religion