The Unwanted WarsNovember/December 2019 43backed one set o Islamist-leaning rebel
groups, and Saudi Arabia and its allies
backed others. Russia—concerned about a
shift in Syria’s orientation and sensing
American hesitation—saw a chance to
reassert itsel in the Middle East and also
intervened, placing it directly at odds
with the United States and, for a time,
Turkey. And Turkey, alarmed at the
prospect o U.S.-backed Kurdish forces
enjoying a safe haven in northern Syria,
intervened directly while also supporting
Syrian Arab opposition groups that it
hoped would Äght the Kurds.
With Syria an arena for regional
tensions, clashes there, even inadvertent
ones, risk becoming Áash points for larger
confrontations. Turkey shot down one
Russian Äghter jet (Moscow blamed Israel
for the downing o another), and U.S.
forces killed hundreds o members o a
private Russian paramilitary group in
eastern Syria. Turkey has attacked U.S.-
backed Kurds, raising the prospect o a
U.S.-Turkish military collision. And Israel
has struck Iranian or Iranian-linked
targets in Syria hundreds o times.
Syria also illustrates why it is so
dicult for the United States to circum-
scribe its involvement in Middle Eastern
conÁicts. During the Obama administra-
tion, Washington backed rebel groups
Äghting both the Assad regime and
but claimed not to be pursuing regime
change (despite supporting forces that
wanted exactly that), not to be seeking
a regional rebalance (despite the clear
impact Assad’s downfall would have on
Iran’s inÁuence), not to be boosting
Turkey’s foes (despite supporting a
Kurdish movement aliated with
Turkey’s mortal enemy), and not to be
seeking to weaken Russia (despite Mos-
cow’s anity for Assad). But the Unitedtenure and hedging against one o his
sudden pivots and the possibility o a
one-term presidency, an attitude that
makes the situation even more Áuid and
unpredictable.
Meanwhile, growing Chinese and
Russian inÁuence have given Iran some
encouragement, but hardly real conÄ-
dence. In the event o an escalation o
tensions between Tehran and Washing-
ton, would Moscow stand with Iran or,
hoping to beneÄt from regional disrup-
tion, stand on the sidelines? Will China
ignore American threats o sanctions
and buy Iranian oil or, in the wake o a
potential trade deal with the United
States, abide by Washington’s demands?
Uncertainty about American intentions
could be even more dangerous. Iran
senses Trump’s distaste for war and is
therefore tempted to push the envelope,
pressuring Washington in the hope o
securing some degree o sanctions relief.
But because Tehran does not know where
the line is, it runs the risk o going too
far and paying the price.
TWO CAUTIONARY TALES
To understand how these dynamics could
interact in the future, it is instructive to
look at how similar dynamics have
interacted in the recent past, in Syria.
Saudi Arabia and others seized on a
homegrown eort to topple the Assad
regime as an opportunity to change the
regional balance o power. They banked
on the opposition prevailing and thereby
ending Damascus’ longtime alliance
with Tehran. Iran and Hezbollah, fearful
o that outcome, poured resources into
the Äght on the regime’s behalf, at huge
human cost. Israel also stepped in,
seeking to roll back Iran’s growing pres-
ence at its borders. Qatar and Turkey