Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon
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The distorting eect o Israeli inÁu-
ence on U.S. policy toward Iran has been
especially pronounced since 2012. That
year, the Republican candidate for presi-
dent, Mitt Romney, seized the U.S.-
Israeli relationship as a Republican asset,
winning a quasi-ocial endorsement
from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu. Politicians and policymakers
on both sides o the aisle rushed to
outdo one another with displays o their
commitment to helping Israel secure its
interests. More recently, Saudi Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has
not so discreetly aligned himsel with
Israel while also skillfully courting the
Trump family, has turned Riyadh into a
Republican asset, as well. To a greater
extent than ever before, the United States
under Trump has outsourced its Middle
East policy to Israel and Saudi Arabia. In
August, for instance, the Trump adminis-
tration permitted Israel to carry out an
airstrike in Iraq against an Iranian-allied
militia—an action that clearly cut against
the U.S. interest in Iraqi stability.
For the United States, this hostility
toward Iran is costly. For one thing, it
increases the risk o armed conÁict. It is
both true and fortunate that since 1987–88,
when U.S. and Iranian ships clashed in
the waters o the Persian Gulf, the two
countries have avoided open hostilities.
But the current proximity o U.S. and
Iranian forces, the countries’ history o
sustained antagonism, and their leaders’
tendency to see each other as locked in a
zero-sum struggle all heighten the risk
o conÁict. The absence o diplomatic ties
and other communication channels
makes confrontations even more likely to
escalate. Everyone knows what a major
U.S. war in the Middle East would look
like, and it is clearly best avoided.o Saddam and the empowerment o
Iraq’s Shiite community, however, the
region’s Sunni rulers eectively recast
the Iranian threat as a confessional one
within the Islamic world. Instead o
being seen as an anticolonial power,
Iran became the leader o a “Shiite
crescent” menacing the United States’
Sunni allies.
To make matters worse, the United
States and Iran have dealt with each
other in a dramatically dierent manner
than the United States and the Soviet
Union did. Cognizant o their respective
nuclear arsenals and global reach, Wash-
ington and Moscow sought to stay
engaged with each other and carefully
avoided interfering with each other’s
vital interests. Kissinger famously charac-
terized the Soviet leadership as “essen-
tially shits,” but that did not stop him—
or other U.S. leaders—from interacting
with them. By contrast, the United
States has refused to engage with Iran,
and the two countries’ relationship has
been one o near-constant irritation
and provocation.
I anything, U.S. antipathy toward
Iran has grown more intense over the last
two decades, even as Tehran has dialed
back its revolutionary ambitions. This
increased animus has coincided with both
the rising inÁuence o evangelical Chris-
tians within the Republican Party and the
growth o public support for Israel in the
United States. In 1989, Gallup found that
49 percent o Americans had a favorable
overall view o Israel. Today, the Ägure
stands at 69 percent. Pro-Israel sentiment
has risen especially rapidly among conser-
vative Republicans, reaching a peak o
87 percent last year. Democrats’ support
has also grown, but currently sits at only
62 percent.