China
the rapid coal-to-gas transformation
- authorities miscalculated available
gas supplies – led to it being officially
aborted in July this year.
Getting things done
Weak public opinion is also an issue
when it comes to climate change, espe-
cially when compared to the strong
public outcry on more visible issues such
as air pollution. Polling done in the past
few years tends to show Chinese public
support of climate actions to be ‘shallow’.
They generally view ‘low-carbon devel-
opment’ in a positive light, as that’s what
the government has been selling for
years, but they also defer much of the
decisionmaking on climate policies to
the government, showing a reluctance
to make substantial contributions to the
cause. Pushing for positive climate action
requires a level of intellectual invest-
ment that most members of the public,
including journalists, are not ready to
make. This problem looks worse in light
of the current data: even though China
has been relatively successful so far in
slowing emissions growth, after a period
of plateauing between 2014-17, emissions
have started rising again due to new stim-
ulus spending in infrastructure aimed at
staving off an economic slowdown.
Then there are areas where consump-
tion patterns, rather than compliance,
will decide emission trajectories. Increas-
ingly affluent Chinese consumers have
demonstrated a penchant for bigger
houses and bigger cars, two trends that
keep climate scientists awake at night.
SUV sales in China surpassed those of
smaller vehicles for the first time in
the second half of 2012 and have since
increased, as middle-class consumers
get a taste for ‘American lifestyles’. Such
behavioural change might be subdued
through restrictions but ultimately
requires a societal conversation about
values and culture.
One world, two systems
Finally, China’s preservation of its envi-
ronment as a national asset poses a
challenge for global governance. As the
cou nt r y, a lbeit belated ly, embraces a nd
appreciates clean air, green forests and
abundant coastal waters, it tends to push
those same problems out of its borders.
China has quickly become the world’s
largest financier and builder of coal-
power plants overseas. Based on a recent
estimation, Chinese financial institutions
and corporations are funding about 102
gigawatts of coal-power plants overseas,
which is close to the total electricity
capacity of Italy. This is in stark contrast
to what’s happening domestically, where,
in early 2017, the government cancelled
or mothballed 120 gigawatts of coal-
power construction. This contradiction
has alarmed environmentalists. In April
2018, ahead of the 2nd Belt and Road
Forum, a coalition of Chinese NGOs
called on the government to ban overseas
coal financing ‘unless no other resources
exist to meet demand’.
But cutting down coal consumption
at home while building up coal capaci-
ties abroad is no contradiction under Xi’s
ecological nationalism. The state-owned
enterprises that lose out on their coal
plants in China are effectively paid off
by a Chinese state that is using all avail-
able means to export its coal technologies
abroad: the resilience of these enterprises
is a key part of the ‘national strength’ that
the leadership is keen to build up. The
same goes for having increasingly strict
fishery regulations domestically to pre-
serve the depleted coastal environment
while strengthening a formidable deep-
water fishery fleet to exploit more effi-
ciently the high seas, and introducing a
decisive natural forest logging ban, which
turns timber traders to look elsewhere.
Exporting environmentally destruc-
tive industries abroad and cutting them
at home are both means of strengthen-
ing the nation – this, rather than any
conception of a global commons that
needs protecting, is what drives China’s
environmentalism.
About 10 years ago, at an environmen-
tal seminar in Washington DC, one par-
ticipant asked a room of environmental
scholars: ‘Deep down, aren’t you all just
grateful that China implements the one-
child policy?’ Ten years later, there are
parts of China’s determined green agenda
that are worth celebrating. But when the
world lauds China’s green leadership,
it should be careful of what exactly it is
grateful for. O
MA TIANJIE IS MANAGING EDITOR OF
CHINADIALOGUE IN BEIJING. BEFORE JOINING
CHINADIALOGUE, HE WAS GREENPEACE’S
PROGRAMME DIRECTOR FOR MAINLAND CHINA.
NOVEMBER- DECEMBER 2019 23
VOICES
FROM
CHINA
XIANG JIAO,
DANCER AND PSYCHOTHERAPIST,
DALI
As told to Alec Ash
What’s the most important priority in
your life and how has that changed?
My priority is myself: to establish my
own life, my personal growth and
development... in greater depth and
scope. Before I was quite confused, and
didn’t know what I wanted, so I focused
on material prerequisites, earning money.
Now I want to live a meaningful life full
of value, including my profession, my
relationships, my family and friends,
contributing to my community, and going
out to explore new worlds... At the same
time, Chinese society has developed,
and more people are meeting these
needs of inner development.