THE POLITICS OF REFORM153Thus far, GCC citizens have not risen up en masse. Why? Two reasons.
The evolution of Gulf society and economy is the first. The 1970s welfare
state improved lives to such an extent that now “nanny state” benefits
look like anachronisms from the era when people were swapping camels
for Land Rovers. Economies have grown massively. High- salary job
opportunities have made free energy unnecessary for many. Gulf citizens
are healthier, more educated, and prosperous than ever before. A growing
number understand the need to move beyond state- funded giveaways.
But not everyone. Gulf citizens may have accepted their losses without
resorting to violence, but many did not go quietly. A storm of protest
erupted on social media, and benefit losses were partly behind strikes and
protests in Oman.^39
And this brings us to the second reason. Citizens have likely been dis-
suaded from action by the increase in state repression that coincided
with the subsidy reforms. Authorities across the Gulf began to crack
down on electronic dissent, including postings on social media that had
once been tolerated. State security forces jailed activists in all six mon-
archies. Stepped- up surveillance and censorship of electronic commu-
nication was backed up, in each country, by legislation criminalizing
dissent in the name of national security. Human Rights Watch and
other groups noted the change, as did the human- rights data gathered
by the US State Department. “Gulf states are intimidating, surveilling,
imprisoning, and silencing activists as part of their all- out assault on
peaceful criticism, but they are seriously mistaken if they think they
can indefinitely block Gulf citizens from using social and other media
to push for positive reforms,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, director of
HRW’s Middle East section.^40
The wave of repression was triggered by factors beyond subsidy
reform, including post– Arab Spring insecurity, a campaign against the
Muslim Brotherhood in some places, backlash against social liberaliza-
tion, and younger leaders’ more activist approach toward politics and
regional relations. The 2017 blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, UAE, and
Bahrain contributed to the tightening of political control. Each of those
regimes threatened to prosecute anyone publicly contradicting the
official line on the embargo. Regardless, alongside dissent in general,