THE POLITICS OF REFORM155in the Gulf, found themselves attracted to the possibility of greater
political participation. The attraction turned out to be fleeting. By
2014, the Arab Spring had morphed into grinding civil warfare and
reprised dictatorship. Public opinion responded in kind. Many Arabs
began equating democracy with sectarianism and instability. Even in
Tunisia, the sole success story of the Arab Spring, support for democ-
racy declined.^41 This shift brought relief to Gulf ruling families, who
have proven unwilling to countenance the dilution of their monopoly
over political control.
Insecurity led Gulf citizens to cluster around their ruling sheikhs. In
Qatar, the proportion of citizens identifying “maintaining order and sta-
bility” as their top priority rose from 37 percent to 75 percent between
2011 and 2014, while only 8 percent of respondents chose “participation”
as a top priority.^42 The accompanying crackdown on dissent probably
made citizens even more reluctant to agitate, given the increased likeli-
hood of prison time.
The social contract between rulers and ruled may actually have
shifted. The contents of these compacts have never been enshrined in
written laws, so no one is sure where the red lines lie. The limits wax and
wane depending on context. During the Arab Spring, when people were
inclined to join pan- Arab uprisings, regimes had less leeway to retract
subsidies than they did after 2014, as oil prices plummeted, chaos spread,
and people rallied around their rulers.
Broadly, the contents of the rentier social contract consist of a trade
of welfare benefits for political support. Citizens seem to need a sense
that living standards are rising, that government is responsive— even if
there is no voting— and that rulers are effective domestically and inter-
nationally. Given these basics, citizens consent to ruling family control
over the state.
Today’s social contract might include a new clause: taxation in
exchange for security (with loss of a subsidy seen as akin to imposi-
tion of a tax). Temporarily, at least, regimes can take away subsidies
“in exchange for ensuring the security of citizens in an increasingly
dangerous neighborhood,” writes Sultan al- Qassemi, a Sharjah- based
social commentator.^43 Even taxes themselves are no longer off the table.