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(John Hannent) #1

  1. WE HAVE A SERIOUS PROBLEM185

  2. Gause, Oil Monarchies, 147.

  3. F. Gregory Gause III, “The Political Economy of National Security in the GCC States,”
    in The Persian Gulf at the Millennium, ed. Gary Sick and Lawrence Potter (New York:
    St. Martin’s, 1997), 80.

  4. Michael Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in Middle
    Eastern Monarchies (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 241– 42.

  5. Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle
    East (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 149, 274– 75.

  6. Sean Foley, The Arab Gulf States: Beyond Oil and Islam (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,
    2010), 85.

  7. Oliver Schlumberger, “Rents, Reform, and Authoritarianism in the Middle East,”
    Internationale Politik Und Gesellschaft 2, no. 2006 (2006): 3.

  8. Rolf Schwarz, “The Political Economy of State- Formation in the Arab Middle East:
    Rentier States, Economic Reform, and Democratization,” Review of International
    Political Economy 15, no. 4 (2008): 607.

  9. Steffen Hertog and Giacomo Luciani, “Energy and Sustainability Policies in the GCC,”
    Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance, and Globalisation in the Gulf
    States, London School of Economics, 2009, 7, 40; emphasis added.

  10. F. Gregory Gause III, “Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East,” Special Report No. 63
    New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011, 11– 12. Gause also touches on distinc-
    tions between fiscal expenditures and on the implications of resource demand for the
    income side of the budget. See also F. Gregory Gause III, “Kings for All Seasons: How
    the Middle East’s Monarchies Survived the Arab Spring,” Brookings Doha Center
    Analysis Paper (Doha, 2013).

  11. Gulf- based IOC executive, interview with author on condition of anonymity, Novem-
    ber 15, 2011.

  12. Mabro and Razavi argue that Mideast gas exports are also driven by subsidies, since
    low domestic prices incentiv ize firms to reap higher expor t returns, even when t hose
    gains are outweighed by the economic benefits of using gas domestically. See Robert
    Mabro, “Egypt’s Oil and Gas: Some Crucial Issues,” Distinguished Lecture series
    (Cairo: Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, 2006). See also Hossein Razavi, “Nat-
    ural Gas Pricing in Countries of the Middle East and North Africa,” Energy Journal
    30, no. 3 (2009): 1– 22.

  13. Matthew Gray, “A Theory of ‘Late Rentierism’ in the Arab States of the Gulf,” schol-
    arly paper (Doha: Georgetown University Center for International and Regional Stud-
    ies, 2011); Christopher M. Davidson, The United Arab Emirates: A Study in Survival
    (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005).

  14. See note 27 in chapter 1 for a list of references on the “resource curse.”

  15. Jim Krane, “Reconsidering the Role of Energy in the Rentier State,” International
    Association for Energy Economics annual conference, Bergen, Norway, June 21, 2016.

  16. Glada Lahn, “Fuel, Food, and Utilities Price Reforms in the GCC: A Wake- up Call
    for Business,” Chatham House, June 2016.

  17. BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2015 (London: BP, 2015). Note that emissions
    from Oman and Bahrain are not included in the GCC total.

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