156 CHAPTER FivE ■ The STaTe
his role as helping “focus news media where they have abdicated their responsibility.
We can’t make policy, but we can ‘encourage’ politicians more than ever before.”^15
But diplomacy may need to encompass more than conducting negotiations and
persuading the public. Negotiators may find they need to use other mea sures of state-
craft, including positive incentives (such as diplomatic recognition or foreign aid in
return for desired actions) and the threat of negative consequences (reduction or elimi-
nation of foreign aid, severance of diplomatic ties, use of coercive force) if the target
state continues to move in a specific direction. The tools of statecraft are not only dip-
lomatic but also economic and military.
The liberal view is that talking, via all forms of diplomacy, is better than not talking
to one’s adversaries. What ever the differences, liberals assert, discussion clarifies the
issues, narrows differences, and encourages bargaining. Use of more forceful actions,
like economic statecraft and use of military force, may make diplomacy less effective
and should be a last resort. Realists are more skeptical about the value of diplomacy.
While not ignoring some benefits, realists tend to see state goals as inherently con-
flictual. Thus, to them, negotiations and diplomacy are apt to be effective only when
backed by force, either economic or military.
economic statecraft
States use more than words to exercise power. They may use economic statecraft—
both engagement (sometimes called positive sanctions) and sanctions (or negative
sanctions)—to try to influence other states.^16 Engaging another state involves offer-
ing a “carrot,” enticing the target state to act in the desired way by rewarding moves it
makes in the desired direction. The assumption is that positive incentives will lead the
target state to change its be hav ior. Sanctions, however, may be imposed more often:
threatening to act or actually taking actions that punish the target state for moves it
makes in the direction not desired. The goal of using the “stick” (sanctions) may be to
punish or reprimand the target state for actions taken or may be to try to change the
future be hav ior of the target state. Table 5.1 provides examples of both positive engage-
ment and negative sanctions.
Since the mid-1990s, states have increasingly imposed smart sanctions, including
freezing assets of governments and/or individuals and imposing commodities sanc-
tions (e.g., on oil, timber, or diamonds). Targeting has involved not just “what” but
also “who” as the international community has tried to affect specific individuals and
rebel groups, reduce ambiguity and loopholes, and avoid the high humanitarian costs
of general sanctions. Despite these modifications, liberals are still wary of sanctions,
believing instead that diplomacy is a more effective way for states to achieve interna-
tional goals. Realist theorists, on the other hand, believe it is necessary in exercising
power to resort to, or threaten to use, sanctions or force more regularly.