I FEEL YOUR PAIN 81they are understood to provide substantial intersubjective knowledge. “By
means of embodied simulation, when witnessing others’ behavior, their
intentions can be directly grasped without the need of representing them in
propositional form” (Gallese et al. 2009, 105, emphasis mine). Mirror neu-
rons enable the “direct comprehension of the actions of others” (110, empha-
sis mine). Second, the neural mirroring of emotions is more crucial than
cognitive modes of transmitting emotional meanings. Mirroring is “the
fundamental mechanism at the basis of the experiential understanding”
of others’ actions and emotions (Gallese et al. 2004, 396, emphasis mine).
Further, mirroring “scaffolds the cognitive description, and, when the for-
mer mechanism is not present or malfunctioning, the latter provides only
a pale, detached account of the emotions of others” (396). So when I see
Andrew cry, mirroring gives me a connected, fundamental experience of
his emotional state. Without the benefit of mirroring, my comprehension
of his crying would be shallow and indifferent. Finally, in contrast to cogni-
tive efforts, this basis of our understanding of others is free of the ambiguity
or errors of symbolic interpretation. Mirroring is a “mechanism or pre-
packaged process that normally guarantees success (i.e., genuine matching
or resemblance)” (Goldman 2009, 246). Because it is not muddied by inter-
pretation, mirroring supports an essentially objective understanding of the
intentions of others; meaning is essentially transferred rather than created.
That is, “the sight of other (living) human or human- like bodies deposits
in one’s brain” motor plans, sensory responses, and basic intentions of the
other (Gordon 2009, n.p., emphasis mine).
Assembled with single- cell recordings of primates’ brains, fmri studies
of human brain activity, debates in analytic philosophy and psychology,
and theories of perception, affordance, and motor schema, this enactment
of mirror neurons offers an alternative to intellectualist accounts of social
cognition that have been widely criticized as too Cartesian, abstract, and
disembodied. It breaks down dichotomies between mind and body, percep-
tion and action. It roots intersubjective understanding in felt attunement
rather than propositional effort. It locates the “other” in one’s own embod-
iment and via motor schema brings the active, experiential body into the
mind- brain. But the enactment of biological relationality it achieves can be
insular, limiting, and normative. Not only does the strong view risk neuro-
reductionism (attributing too much to mirror neurons or mirror systems