PivotingC
hurchill followed the battles closely, and many
Cabinet discussions focused on pilot training
and fighter production. On 16 August, the Prime
Minister visited HQ 11 Group and, witnessing the brav-
ery and losses as aircraft plummeted, said he “had never
been so moved,” “never in the field of human conflict has
so much been owed by so many to so few,” words that he
used later in his famous Commons speech.
Both sides sought to characterise it as a great and glo-
rious battle. But in reality, it was a campaign of attrition.
In air combat two factors are dominant: the unseen fight-
er, and shortage of fuel. In both cases, the British had an
advantage. With radar, RAF fighters were warned of the
location of the enemy, and in dogfights over Britain Ger-
man fighters were always at a fuel disadvantage. Added to
this were the capture of downed German pilots, the rel-
ative ratios of fighter production, the incompetence and
bluster of Göring, and the ambivalence of Hitler. Though
a hard-fought battle, the result was probably inevitable.
Although attacks on cities were withheld, navigation
errors, and just plain fear, caused an increasing number
of bombs to fall on civilians. In July, 258 had been killed
followed by 1,075 deaths in August. On the night of 18–
19 August, bombs fell on southwest London. Extensive
bombing of central London followed on the 22nd and
23rd, and further bombing of Slough and the West on the
23rd and 24th.
As the weight of German bombs on London increased,
Churchill pressed the War Cabinet to endorse reprisal
attacks on Berlin. Whether this was a deliberate induce-
ment to divert German effort from the hard-pressed RAF
airfields onto the vast city of London remains a subject of
debate. Perhaps London was indeed “a valuable fat cow
tied up to attract the beasts of prey”—a necessary sacri-
fice to alleviate the suffering of Fighter Command.
The RAF first raided Berlin on the night of 25 August- Hitler, in a blast of offended righteousness, con-
demned the RAF bombers as pirates, and, in his Sport-
palast speech of 4 September, asserted that Germany’s
response would be to repay the British tenfold, and de-
termined now to “eradicate” British cities. The transfer
to attacking London had two effects. First, it did indeed
reduce pressure on British fighter airbases, but—equal-
ly—the greater distance to London for German bombers
reduced their fighter escort time. This, and the additional
time the RAF was given to assemble “Big Wings,” made
German bombers increasingly vulnerable. As Luftwaffe
losses mounted, daylight bombing became unsustainable.
Aerial TrafalgarO
n 15 September, Churchill visited HQ 11 Group
and witnessed what is now regarded as the peak
of the battle. Churchill asked Air Officer Com-
manding Air Vice Marshal Park what reserves he had; the
answer was “none.” But that week the Luftwaffe lost 298
aircraft, including ninety-nine fighters, while the RAF lost
120.
Fighter Command was far from beaten. When 17 Sep-
tember came, the compiler of the War Diary at German
War Headquarters recorded: “The enemy air force is still
by no means defeated; on the contrary it shows increasing
activity. The weather situation as a whole does not permit
us to expect a period of calm....The Führer therefore de-
cides to postpone ‘Sealion’ indefinitely.”^6(^) For Hitler, it may not have been his “main show,” but
its impact was indeed strategic: Britain would fight on de-
spite the nightly bombing attacks of the Blitz; the US pub-
lic would progressively support Britain; and the mighty
German war machine was now clearly beatable. Oppor-
tunism had proved no substitute for proper strategy.
In a 1942 broadcast, George Orwell suggested that
the Battle of Britain had played the same part in history as
Trafalgar in 1805. In both cases victory minimised the risk
of invasion, even though it still took many years to win the
war, but in the autumn of 1940 that was sufficient.^7 ,
Air Commodore Andrew Lambert is a retired RAF officer
who flew Phantoms and Tornado fighters. He commanded
operations in Northern Iraq, the Falklands, and Bosnia.
Endnotes
- Commons Debate, 30 July 1934, Hansard, vol. 292,
cc. 2325–447. - https://books.google.com/books?id=800EAAAAM-
BAJ&pg=PA47 - Letter C-in-C Fighter Command to the Air Council, 16 May
1940, in Norman L. R. Franks, RAF Fighter Command (Lon-
don: Patrick Stephens, 1992), p. 62. - Churchill, Speech to House of Commons, 18 June 1940.
- Geoffrey Best, Churchill and War (London: Bloomsbury,
2005), p. 178. - German Naval Staff Records in John Killen, The Luftwaffe: A
History (London: Pen and Sword, 2013), p. 149. - Richard Overy, The Battle of Britain (London: Penguin,
2004), p. 122.
BATTLE OF BRITAINPivotingC
hurchill followed thebattles closely, and many
Cabinet discussions focused on pilot training
andfighterproduction.On 16 August,thePrime
MinistervisitedHQ 11 Groupand,witnessingthebrav-
eryandlossesasaircraftplummeted,saidhe“hadnever
beensomoved,” “neverinthefieldofhumanconflicthas
somuchbeenowedbysomanytosofew,”wordsthathe
usedlaterinhisfamousCommonsspeech.
Bothsidessoughttocharacteriseit asa greatandglo-
riousbattle.Butinreality,itwasa campaignofattrition.
Inaircombattwofactorsaredominant:theunseenfight-
er,andshortageoffuel.Inbothcases,theBritishhadan
advantage.Withradar,RAFfighterswerewarnedofthe
locationoftheenemy,andindogfightsoverBritainGer-
manfighterswerealwaysata fueldisadvantage.Addedto
thiswerethecaptureofdownedGermanpilots,therel-
ativeratiosoffighterproduction,theincompetenceand
blusterofGöring,andtheambivalenceofHitler.Though
a hard-foughtbattle,theresultwasprobablyinevitable.
Althoughattacksoncitieswerewithheld,navigation
errors,andjustplainfear,causedanincreasingnumber
ofbombstofalloncivilians.InJuly, 258 hadbeenkilled
followedby1,075deathsinAugust.Onthenightof18–
19 August,bombsfellonsouthwestLondon.Extensive
bombingof central Londonfollowed onthe 22ndand
23rd,andfurtherbombingofSloughandtheWestonthe
23rdand24th.
AstheweightofGermanbombsonLondonincreased,
Churchillpressed theWar Cabinet to endorse reprisal
attacksonBerlin.Whetherthiswasa deliberateinduce-
menttodivertGermaneffortfromthehard-pressedRAF
airfieldsontothevastcityofLondonremainsa subjectof
debate.PerhapsLondonwasindeed“a valuablefatcow
tieduptoattractthebeastsofprey”—a necessarysacri-
ficetoalleviatethesufferingofFighterCommand.
The RAF first raided Berlin on the night of 25August- Hitler, in a blast of offended righteousness,con-
demned the RAF bombers as pirates, and, in hisSport-
palast speech of 4 September, asserted that Germany’s
response would be to repay the British tenfold,andde-
termined now to “eradicate” British cities. Thetransfer
to attacking London had two effects. First, it didindeed
reduce pressure on British fighter airbases, but—equal-
ly—the greater distance to London for German bombers
reduced their fighter escort time. This, and the additional
time the RAF was given to assemble “Big Wings,”made
German bombers increasingly vulnerable. As Luftwaffe
losses mounted, daylight bombing became unsustainable.
Aerial TrafalgarO
n 15 September, Churchill visited HQ 11 Group
and witnessed what is now regarded as the peak
of the battle. Churchill asked Air Officer Com-
manding Air Vice Marshal Park what reserves he had; the
answer was “none.” But that week the Luftwaffe lost 298
aircraft, including ninety-nine fighters, while the RAF lost
120.
Fighter Command was far from beaten. When 17 Sep-
tember came, the compiler of the War Diary at German
War Headquarters recorded: “The enemy air force is still
by no means defeated; on the contrary it shows increasing
activity. The weather situation as a whole does not permit
us to expect a period of calm....The Führer therefore de-
cidestopostpone‘Sealion’indefinitely.”^6
For Hitler, it may not have been his “main show,” but
its impact was indeed strategic: Britain would fight on de-
spite the nightly bombing attacks of the Blitz; the US pub-
lic would progressively support Britain; and the mighty
German war machine was now clearly beatable. Oppor-
tunismhadprovednosubstituteforproperstrategy.
In a 1942 broadcast, George Orwell suggested that
the Battle of Britain had played the same part in history as
Trafalgar in 1805. In both cases victory minimised the risk
of invasion, even though it still took many years to win the
war, but in the autumn of 1940 that was sufficient.^7 ,Air Commodore Andrew Lambert is a retired RAF officer
who flew Phantoms and Tornado fighters. He commanded
operations in Northern Iraq, the Falklands, and Bosnia.Endnotes- Commons Debate, 30 July 1934, Hansard, vol. 292,
cc. 2325–447. - https://books.google.com/books?id=800EAAAAM-
BAJ&pg=PA47 - Letter C-in-C Fighter Command to the Air Council, 16 May
1940, in Norman L. R. Franks, RAF Fighter Command (Lon-
don: Patrick Stephens, 1992), p. 62. - Churchill, Speech to House of Commons, 18 June 1940.
- Geoffrey Best, Churchill and War (London: Bloomsbury,
2005), p. 178. - German Naval Staff Records in John Killen, The Luftwaffe: A
History (London: Pen and Sword, 2013), p. 149. - Richard Overy, The Battle of Britain (London: Penguin,
2004), p. 122.
BATTLE OF BRITAIN