Royal Navy no less strong, and the British Army far more
prepared. All this argued that the balance would swing in
Britain’s favour.
And here the fatal overconfidence of Luftwaffe com-
mander Herman Göring combined with Hitler’s oppor-
tunism. Göring, a highly successful fighter pilot who had
been awarded the Blue Max in the First World War, had
supported Hitler in his rise to political power, and was
now minister for rearmament, a post for which his nat-
ural arrogance, morphine addiction, and laziness made
him particularly unsuited. His Luftwaffe had indeed done
well, but only as a striking arm of the new Blitzkrieg form
of attack, and any independent role was outside the Luft-
waffe’s doctrine, capability, and practice. Of course, given
the weakness of the Kriegsmarine and the vulnerability of
any invasion armada, success in the air offered the best
prospect of protecting any rapid dash across the Channel.
To prevent RAF attacks on the invasion fleet, as well as to
offer some defence against the Royal Navy, the Luftwaffe
had first to gain mastery of the skies.
Hitler signed Directive 16 for Operation Sea Lion
(the invasion of Britain) on 16 July. For this, air superior-
ity was a sine qua non.
Hoping to appear statesmanlike, Hitler spoke in the
Reichstag on 19 July in a low-key style offering Britain
his victor’s terms. After what seemed a very reasonable
offer by the “Master of Europe,” Germans were incredu-
lous when the proposal was almost flippantly rejected—
though with some justification it turns out once the terms
for defeated France became known.
If Britain could still be coerced or defeated: well and
good. If not, then she would be finally isolated once Rus-
sia were conquered. But, if the invasion were to be post-
poned to 1941, as Raeder wanted, any assault would in-
evitably conflict with Operation Barbarossa (the invasion
of Russia). So, would it be Barbarossa in 1941, followed
by Britain in 1942? Or would Churchill simply capitulate
once Moscow fell? Perhaps Hitler wanted to keep all his
options open. If air superiority, then Sea Lion; if not, then
Barbarossa! Probably Hitler thought his indecisiveness
was flexibility.
Göring, far more preoccupied with his own business,
failed to attend any of Hitler’s meetings. On 30 July, there-
fore, Hitler sent a brusque note directing Göring to put
his forces at twelve hours’ notice to “begin the great battle
of the Luftwaffe against England.” On 31 July, however,
at a meeting with his senior generals in Berchtesgaden,
Hitler directed that planning should already begin for the
assault on Russia.ObjectivesT
he aims of Göring’s “great battle” were for the
Luftwaffe to grasp air superiority, destroy the
rest of the RAF, prepare the ground for invasion
(while protecting its own bases and ports), and perhaps
even coerce the British into surrender. If invasion were
ordered, the Luftwaffe would defeat the Royal Navy’s task
forces, protect the invasion fleet, and provide support for
the offensive on London—quite a tall order!
For the RAF, in contrast, the task was simple: survive.
The German concept of battle was founded both on
military momentum and ill-considered strategic clichés.
There was little real prospect of success, but much to be
lost through failure.
Bizarrely, the Battle of Britain did not need to be
fought at all. Hitler could have consolidated his position
on the continent, ignored the British, and begun his plan-
ning for Barbarossa. The British could have retreated to
their island home, licked their wounds, built up their de-
pleted forces, and considered what to do next. But the die
was cast.
Führer Directive 17 (“The Conduct of Air and Na-
val Warfare against Britain”) was issued on 1 August. Its
purpose was to “establish conditions favourable for the
conquest of Britain.” The attack would begin on 5 August,
with “the priority to overcome the British Air Force...in
the shortest possible time,” then to concentrate on bomb-
ing enemy ports, except those required for Sea Lion. Ter-
ror attacks on cities were withheld.
The Luftflotte commanders, with bases dotted along
the Channel coast, saw it as their primary task to destroy
the RAF’s fighters, not only by attacking British airfields,
but also by air combat in the skies over Britain. Göring be-
lieved that this was achievable in just four good days, with
the campaign begun by Adlerangriff, an “eagle attack.”
Unsurprisingly, Luftwaffe direction of the battle was
erratic. When the weather was good, the offensive was not
ready; once begun, targets seemed chosen at random, and
priorities reflected changing strategies. RAF forward op-
erating bases were heavily struck while main fighter bases
were almost ignored; when Adlerangriff was finally or-
dered on 13 August, it was then cancelled due to weather.
The first real coordinated attack finally began on 15 Au-
gust.
While RAF fighters concentrated on bombers, they
became vulnerable to fighter escorts. According to wildly
optimistic Luftwaffe Intelligence, by 16 August eight RAF
bases were deemed to be out of action and 770 RAF fight-
ers destroyed. Nevertheless, the Luftwaffe’s vulnerable
Stukas had had to be withdrawn from combat, and fighter
escorts tied ever closer to the bombers.BATTLE OF BRITAINRoyalNavynolessstrong,andtheBritishArmyfarmore
prepared.Allthisarguedthatthebalancewouldswingin
Britain’sfavour.
AndherethefataloverconfidenceofLuftwaffecom-
manderHermanGöringcombinedwithHitler’soppor-
tunism.Göring,a highlysuccessfulfighterpilotwhohad
beenawardedtheBlueMaxintheFirstWorldWar,had
supportedHitlerinhisrisetopoliticalpower,andwas
nowministerforrearmament,a postforwhichhisnat-
uralarrogance, morphineaddiction, andlaziness made
himparticularlyunsuited.HisLuftwaffehadindeeddone
well,butonlyasa strikingarmofthenewBlitzkriegform
ofattack,andanyindependentrolewasoutsidetheLuft-
waffe’sdoctrine,capability,andpractice.Ofcourse,given
theweaknessoftheKriegsmarineandthevulnerabilityof
anyinvasionarmada,successintheairofferedthebest
prospectofprotectinganyrapiddashacrosstheChannel.
TopreventRAFattacksontheinvasionfleet,aswellasto
offersomedefenceagainsttheRoyalNavy,theLuftwaffe
hadfirsttogainmasteryoftheskies.
Hitler signedDirective 16 forOperation Sea Lion
(theinvasionofBritain)on 16 July.Forthis,airsuperior-
itywasasinequanon.
Hopingtoappearstatesmanlike,Hitlerspokeinthe
Reichstagon 19 July ina low-keystyle offeringBritain
hisvictor’sterms.Afterwhatseemeda veryreasonable
offerbythe“MasterofEurope,”Germanswereincredu-
louswhentheproposalwasalmostflippantlyrejected—
thoughwithsomejustificationit turnsoutoncetheterms
fordefeatedFrancebecameknown.
IfBritaincouldstillbecoercedordefeated:welland
good.Ifnot,thenshewouldbefinallyisolatedonceRus-
siawereconquered.But,if theinvasionweretobepost-
ponedto1941,asRaederwanted,anyassaultwouldin-
evitablyconflictwithOperationBarbarossa(theinvasion
ofRussia).So,woulditbeBarbarossain1941,followed
byBritainin1942?OrwouldChurchillsimplycapitulate
onceMoscowfell?PerhapsHitlerwantedtokeepallhis
optionsopen.If airsuperiority,thenSeaLion;if not,then
Barbarossa! Probably Hitlerthought his indecisiveness
wasflexibility.
Göring, far more preoccupied with his ownbusiness,
failed to attend any of Hitler’s meetings. On 30July,there-
fore, Hitler sent a brusque note directing Göringtoput
his forces at twelve hours’ notice to “begin thegreatbattle
of the Luftwaffe against England.” On 31 July,however,
at a meeting with his senior generals in Berchtesgaden,
Hitler directed that planning should already beginforthe
assault on Russia.
ObjectivesT
he aimsof Göring’s “great battle” werefor the
Luftwaffe to grasp air superiority, destroy the
restoftheRAF,preparethegroundforinvasion
(whileprotectingitsownbasesandports),andperhaps
evencoercetheBritishintosurrender.Ifinvasionwere
ordered,theLuftwaffewoulddefeattheRoyalNavy’stask
forces,protecttheinvasionfleet,andprovidesupportfor
theoffensiveonLondon—quitea tallorder!
FortheRAF,incontrast,thetaskwassimple:survive.
TheGermanconceptofbattlewasfoundedbothon
militarymomentumandill-consideredstrategicclichés.
Therewaslittlerealprospectofsuccess,butmuchtobe
lostthroughfailure.
Bizarrely, the Battle of Britain did not need to be
foughtatall.Hitlercouldhaveconsolidatedhisposition
onthecontinent,ignoredtheBritish,andbegunhisplan-
ningforBarbarossa.TheBritishcouldhaveretreatedto
theirislandhome,lickedtheirwounds,builtuptheirde-
pletedforces,andconsideredwhattodonext.Butthedie
wascast.
Führer Directive 17 (“TheConductofAirandNa-
valWarfareagainstBritain”)wasissuedon 1 August.Its
purposewasto“establish conditions favourableforthe
conquestofBritain.” Theattackwouldbeginon5 August,
with“theprioritytoovercometheBritishAirForce...in
theshortestpossibletime,”thentoconcentrateonbomb-
ingenemyports,exceptthoserequiredforSeaLion.Ter-
rorattacksoncitieswerewithheld.
TheLuftflottecommanders,withbasesdottedalong
theChannelcoast,sawit astheirprimarytasktodestroy
theRAF’sfighters,notonlybyattackingBritishairfields,
butalsobyaircombatintheskiesoverBritain.Göringbe-
lievedthatthiswasachievableinjustfourgooddays,with
thecampaignbegunbyAdlerangriff, an“eagleattack.”
Unsurprisingly,Luftwaffedirectionofthebattlewas
erratic.Whentheweatherwasgood,theoffensivewasnot
ready;oncebegun,targetsseemedchosenatrandom,and
prioritiesreflectedchangingstrategies.RAFforwardop-
eratingbaseswereheavilystruckwhilemainfighterbases
werealmost ignored; when Adlerangriffwas finally or-
deredon 13 August,it wasthencancelledduetoweather.
Thefirstrealcoordinatedattackfinallybeganon 15 Au-
gust.
While RAF fighters concentrated on bombers, they
became vulnerable to fighter escorts. According to wildly
optimistic Luftwaffe Intelligence, by 16 August eight RAF
bases were deemed to be out of action and 770 RAF fight-
ers destroyed. Nevertheless, the Luftwaffe’s vulnerable
Stukas had had to be withdrawn from combat, and fighter
escorts tied ever closer to the bombers.BATTLE OF BRITAIN