CHURCHILL AND PORTAL
Portal was marked afterwards by Sir Hugh Trenchard, the
“Father of the Royal Air Force,” for higher office. Portal
served in several key staff appointments alongside Tren-
chard, as well as spending multiple tours in military edu-
cation and excelling as both a squadron commander and
joint commander in Aden. His rise was meteoric but ful-
ly deserved and reached its apex when he replaced Cyril
Newall as Chief of Air Staff (CAS) in October 1940. The
infusion of new blood to the COS Committee was no ac-
cident. Following one late meeting involving the Chiefs,
Churchill remarked, “I have to wage modern war with an-
cient weapons.”^4 The remark was somewhat ironic since
the Prime Minister was older than all three Chiefs, but
younger men were needed because Churchill was a de-
manding taskmaster.
Churchill was given to excesses of opinion, to wild
and inaccurate strategic assessments, to great impatience,
and occasional fits of pique. He incorrectly predicted the
obsolescence of the tank, the defensibility of single ves-
sels against aircraft, and the likely static nature of land
warfare in the future. By contrast, he was one of the first
to recognize the threats from both Nazism and commu-
nism. President Roosevelt once observed, “Winston has
fifty ideas a day, and three or four are good.”^5 Churchill
needed a stabilizing voice to curb his excesses and more
disciplined strategic thinkers to direct his legendary ener-
gy. Portal was Churchill’s perfect foil.
Churchill’s modus operandi allowed him to oper-
ate throughout the war and survive intact where many
younger men faded. He read in bed during the morning,
napped in the afternoon, and worked late into the night.
He typically started COS meetings at 9:30 pm and fin-
ished them well after midnight. These hours were espe-
cially challenging for the Chiefs, who had to lead their
services during the day. But everyone had to dance to the
Prime Minister’s tune, a peculiar battle rhythm exacerbat-
ed by Churchill’s personal manner.
Working with Winston
C
hurchill relentlessly questioned the Chiefs about
all areas of the war: strategy, tactics, technology,
and logistics. He did not wish to divine the mi-
nutiae of each service, just to ensure his Chiefs were on
top of things. The avalanche of minutes emanating from
the Prime Minister’s office led to outpourings of frustra-
tion by some. General Brooke penned the most acerbic
critique. In September 1944 he wrote, “[Churchill] has
got only half the picture in his mind, talks absurdities and
makes my blood boil to listen to his nonsense....Never
have I admired and despised a man simultaneously to the
same extent.”^6 Brooke found Churchill equally exasperat-
ing and inspiring, his passion for operational details only
matched by his ignorance of them. Portal, by contrast,
took it all in his stride.
Churchill had particular bones of contention he ad-
dressed repeatedly. A favorite Air Force topic was the ra-
tio of aircraft to personnel. In Portal’s first month as CAS,
Churchill queried the “very large excess of crews” in Army
Co-operation Command (ACC) squadrons; they had
177 crews and 147 aircraft. Churchill suggested the ex-
cess could offset the marked shortage of pilots in Bomber
Command.^7 Portal’s response was, perhaps, surprising.
Instead of grasping the opportunity to reinforce the RAF’s
bomber force, the command of which Portal had just re-
linquished, he instead defended ACC manning levels:
It is true that there are more pilots than aircraft in
Army Co-operation squadrons, but there are sound
reasons for this. In the first place, there are no O[per-
ational].T[raining].U[nits].s for these squadrons
other than No. 112 Canadian squadron, which is used
as a training squadron to No. 110 Canadian squad-
ron. In all the other squadrons, it is necessary to train
pilots in the squadrons themselves to hold a reserve
against possible casualties. The main task of these
squadrons at present is training in co-operation with
Army Commands, but they have many additional du-
ties laid upon them. They are called on to provide res-
cue services for fighter pilots shot down over the sea,
to provide pilots to fly communication aircraft for the
Army Command, and to train future glider pilots in
Moth aircraft.
In spite of this, we have recently reduced our com-
mitment to Home Forces by 30% in order to free pi-
lots for operational commands, and we have econo-
mised in pilots by not filling up Army Co-operation
training courses for some time past, the pilots thus
made available being released for Fighter Command.
The present provision of pilots is therefore not ex-
cessive for the existing commitments, and I feel cer-
tain that the War Office would be most reluctant to
accept any further decrease in the scale of air co-oper-
ation provided for the Army.
On the day you mention it is true only 147 aircraft
were shown as available for immediate operations,
but the squadrons were in fact very nearly up to es-
tablishment. As in all squadrons, a number of aircraft
were undergoing routine overhauls and minor re-
pairs.^8
Several elements in Portal’s communiqué encapsu-
late his thinking as CAS. Portal was, first and foremost,
CHURCHILLANDPORTAL
PortalwasmarkedafterwardsbySirHughTrenchard,the
“FatheroftheRoyalAirForce,”forhigheroffice.Portal
servedinseveralkeystaffappointmentsalongsideTren-
chard,aswellasspendingmultipletoursinmilitaryedu-
cationandexcellingasbotha squadroncommanderand
jointcommanderinAden.Hisrisewasmeteoricbutful-
lydeservedandreacheditsapexwhenhereplacedCyril
NewallasChiefofAirStaff(CAS)inOctober1940.The
infusionofnewbloodtotheCOSCommitteewasnoac-
cident.FollowingonelatemeetinginvolvingtheChiefs,
Churchillremarked,“Ihavetowagemodernwarwithan-
cientweapons.”^4 Theremarkwassomewhatironicsince
thePrimeMinisterwasolderthanallthreeChiefs,but
youngermenwereneededbecauseChurchillwasa de-
mandingtaskmaster.
Churchillwasgiventoexcessesof opinion,towild
andinaccuratestrategicassessments,togreatimpatience,
andoccasionalfitsofpique.Heincorrectlypredictedthe
obsolescenceofthetank,thedefensibilityofsingleves-
sels againstaircraft,and thelikelystatic natureof land
warfareinthefuture.Bycontrast,hewasoneofthefirst
torecognizethethreatsfrombothNazismandcommu-
nism.PresidentRooseveltonceobserved,“Winstonhas
fiftyideasa day,andthreeorfouraregood.”^5 Churchill
neededa stabilizingvoicetocurbhisexcessesandmore
disciplinedstrategicthinkerstodirecthislegendaryener-
gy.PortalwasChurchill’sperfectfoil.
Churchill’s modus operandi allowed him to oper-
ate throughout the war and survive intact where many
younger men faded. He read in bed during the morning,
napped in the afternoon, and worked late into the night.
He typically started COS meetings at 9:30 pm and fin-
ished them well after midnight. These hours were espe-
cially challenging for the Chiefs, who had to lead their
services during the day. But everyone had to dance to the
Prime Minister’s tune, a peculiar battle rhythm exacerbat-
ed by Churchill’s personal manner.
Working with Winston
C
hurchill relentlessly questioned the Chiefs about
all areas of the war: strategy, tactics, technology,
and logistics. He did not wish to divine the mi-
nutiae of each service, just to ensure his Chiefs were on
top of things. The avalanche of minutes emanating from
the Prime Minister’s office led to outpourings of frustra-
tion by some. General Brooke penned the most acerbic
critique. In September 1944 he wrote, “[Churchill] has
got only half the picture in his mind, talks absurdities and
makes my blood boil to listen to his nonsense....Never
have I admired and despised a man simultaneously to the
same extent.”^6 Brooke found Churchill equally exasperat-
ing and inspiring, his passion for operational details only
matched by his ignorance of them. Portal, by contrast,
tookit allinhisstride.
Churchill had particular bones of contention he ad-
dressed repeatedly. A favorite Air Force topic was the ra-
tio of aircraft to personnel. In Portal’s first month as CAS,
Churchill queried the “very large excess of crews” in Army
Co-operation Command (ACC) squadrons; they had
177 crews and 147 aircraft. Churchill suggested the ex-
cess could offset the marked shortage of pilots in Bomber
Command.^7 Portal’s response was, perhaps, surprising.
Instead of grasping the opportunity to reinforce the RAF’s
bomber force, the command of which Portal had just re-
linquished, he instead defended ACC manning levels:
It is true that there are more pilots than aircraft in
Army Co-operation squadrons, but there are sound
reasons for this. In the first place, there are no O[per-
ational].T[raining].U[nits].s for these squadrons
other than No. 112 Canadian squadron, which is used
as a training squadron to No. 110 Canadian squad-
ron. In all the other squadrons, it is necessary to train
pilots in the squadrons themselves to hold a reserve
against possible casualties. The main task of these
squadrons at present is training in co-operation with
Army Commands, but they have many additional du-
ties laid upon them. They are called on to provide res-
cue services for fighter pilots shot down over the sea,
to provide pilots to fly communication aircraft for the
Army Command, and to train future glider pilots in
Mothaircraft.
In spite of this, we have recently reduced our com-
mitment to Home Forces by 30% in order to free pi-
lots for operational commands, and we have econo-
mised in pilots by not filling up Army Co-operation
training courses for some time past, the pilots thus
madeavailablebeingreleasedforFighterCommand.
The present provision of pilots is therefore not ex-
cessive for the existing commitments, and I feel cer-
tain that the War Office would be most reluctant to
accept any further decrease in the scale of air co-oper-
ationprovidedfortheArmy.
On the day you mention it is true only 147 aircraft
were shown as available for immediate operations,
but the squadrons were in fact very nearly up to es-
tablishment. As in all squadrons, a number of aircraft
were undergoing routine overhauls and minor re-
pairs.^8
Several elements in Portal’s communiqué encapsu-
late his thinking as CAS. Portal was, first and foremost,
