Finest Hour – July 2019

ing overseas, there was a vast staff and defense network

inflating the numbers compared to domestic commands.

Portal continued:

The actual number of heads per serviceable aircraft,

therefore, works out at something under twen-

ty-three. This is about 60% of the number found

necessary for the Air Force working with the Brit-

ish Army in France and is actually less than the

number per machine on the battle front in the last

war, when aircraft and engines were far more eas-

ily repaired and maintained than they are today.^12

Portal again identified individual environmental

characteristics, and mitigating factors altering any calcu-

lus. Later in the minute, Portal described the long lines of

communication in the theatre and how the changing flux

of war necessitated a generous allocation of personnel be-

cause sending reinforcements would be time-consuming.

This represents a hallmark of Portal’s leadership. He was

consistently loath to make rash adjustments, ever aware

of the friction inherent in moving personnel between the-

aters. Churchill, though, was correct to identify possible

inefficiencies and keep the CAS honest. Unsurprisingly,

Churchill’s inquiries did not stop there.

On 1 May 1941, Churchill queried the gap of 442

between the effective strength of crews in Fighter Com-

mand and the number of aircraft, with a gap of 126 when

only “fully operational” crews were considered.^13 Having

seen several iterations of this discussion, Portal some-

what sardonically responded, “I am sorry that I have not

already made clear the reason for this gap.” He then con-

tinued, “It is that, owing to the fact that at any one time, a

number of pilots in each squadron are resting or on leave

or sick, it is necessary to have a larger number of pilots on

establishment than aircraft.”^14 Churchill, recognizing his

game had been rumbled, quipped back asking whether

the pilots had to go on leave or be sick together.

Diplomatic Airman

C

hurchill had a deliberately confrontational meth-

od of engagement with Portal, indeed with all

the Chiefs of Staff. The Prime Minister was no

technical or subject matter expert, so used detailed and

repeated questions to probe subordinates for signs of ig-

norance. Brooke became frustrated, but Portal reveled in

the intimate details. Churchill’s minutes forced Portal to

reconsider his assumptions, a process Portal valued. He

had demonstrated his mettle early on, gained the trust

of the Prime Minister, and, moreover, shown a talent for

both holistic thinking and preferring diplomacy over pa-

rochialism.

It was in the diplomatic arena that Portal was of great-

est value to Churchill. Eisenhower wrote of the CAS: “His

distinguishing characteristic was balance, with perfect

control of his temper; even in the most intense argument

I never saw him show anger or unusual excitement.”^15

Portal grasped both the importance of the American alli-

ance and how much could be achieved through the Lend-

Lease Act, which provided the RAF with additional air-

craft that could not be produced by British industry.

The importance of Portal to Churchill is best evi-

denced following an announced reduction in the British

allocation of aircraft from the US. In the aftermath of the

attack on Pearl Harbor and the American entry into the

war, change was inevitable. Portal, understanding Chur-

chill was likely furious about the reduction in allocation,

wrote the Prime Minister to pre-empt any histrionics

during the forthcoming visit of US Army Air Force Com-

manding General “Hap” Arnold. Portal began by empa-

thizing with Churchill’s point of view, one it would have

been easy for the RAF service chief to share: “There is of

course much to be said in reply to his (Arnold’s) argu-

ments as we, for our part, feel that any sudden curtailment

of deliveries upon which we had counted would involve

grave loss to the common effort.”^16 Portal, however, then

recommended a more diplomatic strategy:

You may decide that your reply should not dwell on

this aspect of the matter but instead should concen-

trate on the practical results we hope to achieve from

the forthcoming discussions. In that event, I suggest

the following would be the principal points to be

brought out:

(i) that we recognise and applaud the anxiety of the

U.S. Air Forces to throw their full weight into the

fight as early as possible;

“I never saw him show anger or unusual excitement.”

–Eisenhower on Portal

CHURCHILL AND PORTAL

ingoverseas,therewasa vaststaffanddefensenetwork

inflatingthenumberscomparedtodomesticcommands.

Portalcontinued:

The actualnumberofheadsperserviceableaircraft,

therefore, works out at something under twen-

ty-three. This is about 60% of the number found

necessary for theAir Force working with the Brit-

ish Army in France and is actually less than the

numberper machineonthe battlefrontin thelast

war, when aircraft and engines were far more eas-

ily repaired and maintained than they are today.^12

Portal again identified individual environmental

characteristics,andmitigatingfactorsalteringanycalcu-

lus.Laterintheminute,Portaldescribedthelonglinesof

communicationinthetheatreandhowthechangingflux

ofwarnecessitateda generousallocationofpersonnelbe-

causesendingreinforcementswouldbetime-consuming.

Thisrepresentsa hallmarkofPortal’sleadership.Hewas

consistentlyloathtomakerashadjustments,everaware

ofthefrictioninherentinmovingpersonnelbetweenthe-

aters.Churchill,though,wascorrecttoidentifypossible

inefficienciesandkeeptheCAShonest.Unsurprisingly,

Churchill’sinquiriesdidnotstopthere.

On 1 May 1941, Churchill queried the gap of 442

between the effective strength of crews in Fighter Com-

mand and the number of aircraft, with a gap of 126 when

only “fully operational” crews were considered.^13 Having

seen several iterations of this discussion, Portal some-

what sardonically responded, “I am sorry that I have not

already made clear the reason for this gap.” He then con-

tinued, “It is that, owing to the fact that at any one time, a

number of pilots in each squadron are resting or on leave

or sick, it is necessary to have a larger number of pilots on

establishment than aircraft.”^14 Churchill, recognizing his

game had been rumbled, quipped back asking whether

the pilots had to go on leave or be sick together.

Diplomatic Airman

C

hurchill had a deliberately confrontational meth-

od of engagement with Portal, indeed with all

the Chiefs of Staff. The Prime Minister was no

technical or subject matter expert, so used detailed and

repeated questions to probe subordinates for signs of ig-

norance. Brooke became frustrated, but Portal reveled in

the intimate details. Churchill’s minutes forced Portal to

reconsider his assumptions, a process Portal valued. He

had demonstrated his mettle early on, gained the trust

of the Prime Minister, and, moreover, shown a talent for

both holistic thinking and preferring diplomacy over pa-

rochialism.

It was in the diplomatic arena that Portal was of great-

est value to Churchill. Eisenhower wrote of the CAS: “His

distinguishing characteristic was balance, with perfect

control of his temper; even in the most intense argument

I never saw him show anger or unusual excitement.”^15

Portal grasped both the importance of the American alli-

ance and how much could be achieved through the Lend-

Lease Act, which provided the RAF with additional air-

craftthatcouldnotbeproducedbyBritishindustry.

The importance of Portal to Churchill is best evi-

denced following an announced reduction in the British

allocation of aircraft from the US. In the aftermath of the

attack on Pearl Harbor and the American entry into the

war, change was inevitable. Portal, understanding Chur-

chill was likely furious about the reduction in allocation,

wrote the Prime Minister to pre-empt any histrionics

during the forthcoming visit of US Army Air Force Com-

manding General “Hap” Arnold. Portal began by empa-

thizing with Churchill’s point of view, one it would have

been easy for the RAF service chief to share: “There is of

course much to be said in reply to his (Arnold’s) argu-

ments as we, for our part, feel that any sudden curtailment

of deliveries upon which we had counted would involve

grave loss to the common effort.”^16 Portal, however, then

recommended a more diplomatic strategy:

You may decide that your reply should not dwell on

this aspect of the matter but instead should concen-

trate on the practical results we hope to achieve from

the forthcoming discussions. In that event, I suggest

the following would be the principal points to be

brought out:

(i) that we recognise and applaud the anxiety of the

U.S. Air Forces to throw their full weight into the

fight as early as possible;

“I never saw him show anger or unusual excitement.”

–Eisenhower on Portal

CHURCHILL AND PORTAL