Notes 173
costs, accelerating the decline in productivity of the agricultural industry, hege-
monic decline, and erosion in the network of alliances of the bishop. Two super-
powers usually arise as claims to the crown and the victor becomes the one who
can successfully obtain the support of the incoming bishop. The hegemonic pow-
ers do not have to fight all wars but they must prepare for the climate of world
war. Outputs of hegemonic struggle are determined primarily by economic fac-
tors rather than by military elements. All in Levy, “Theories of General War,”
pp. 349–350, fns. 21–22.
- Numerous researchers argue that the current single-polar system will
not be maintained over time and will become multipolar as very soon. Charles
Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1 (1990–1991),
pp. 23–33; Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will
Rise,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5–51, at p. 7; Michael
Manstanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand
Strategy after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997),
pp. 49–88; Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1997), p. 18; Charles A. Kupchan, “Rethinking Europe,” The National Interest, Vol.
56 (Summer 1999), pp. 73–79; Charles A. Kupchan, “After Pax Americana: Benign
Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity,” International
Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 40–79; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theor-
ies,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913–917,
at p. 914. - Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, “Who ‘Won’ Libya? The
Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy,” International
Security, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Winter 2005/06), pp. 47–86. - William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and the End of the Cold War,” International
Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 91–129. - Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987). - Christopher Layne discusses this subject particularly in the context of uni-
polar systems. Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion”; John Ikenberry asks why no bal-
ancing forces against the United States formed after the end of the Cold War. John
G. Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2002); Peter Turchin presents a mathematical formula
for solving one of the major historical questions: the reasons for the rise and fall
of great civilizations. Peter Turchin, Historical Dynamics: Why States Rise and Fall
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). Also see Peter Turchin, War and
Peace and War: The Life Cycles of Imperial Nations (New York: Penguin Group, 2007);
and Peter Turchin, War and Peace and War: The Rise and Fall of Empires (New York: A
Plum Book, 2007). - One of the main expectations of international relations theory is that it will
be able to forecast the occurrence of significant events in the international scene.
The end of the Cold War, for example, was not the first major event that surprised
international relations researchers and will probably not be the last, but without
doubt it is one of the most significant events that none of the main theories in
the field, including the realistic theory, anticipated. William C. Wohlforth, “Reality
Check: Revising Theories of International Politics in Response to the End of the
Cold War,” World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 4 (July 1998), pp. 650–680, at p. 651.