Int Rel Theo War

(ff) #1

Notes 173


costs, accelerating the decline in productivity of the agricultural industry, hege-
monic decline, and erosion in the network of alliances of the bishop. Two super-
powers usually arise as claims to the crown and the victor becomes the one who
can successfully obtain the support of the incoming bishop. The hegemonic pow-
ers do not have to fight all wars but they must prepare for the climate of world
war. Outputs of hegemonic struggle are determined primarily by economic fac-
tors rather than by military elements. All in Levy, “Theories of General War,”
pp. 349–350, fns. 21–22.



  1. Numerous researchers argue that the current single-polar system will
    not be maintained over time and will become multipolar as very soon. Charles
    Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1 (1990–1991),
    pp. 23–33; Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will
    Rise,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5–51, at p. 7; Michael
    Manstanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand
    Strategy after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997),
    pp. 49–88; Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
    1997), p. 18; Charles A. Kupchan, “Rethinking Europe,” The National Interest, Vol.
    56 (Summer 1999), pp. 73–79; Charles A. Kupchan, “After Pax Americana: Benign
    Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity,” International
    Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 40–79; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theor-
    ies,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913–917,
    at p. 914.

  2. Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, “Who ‘Won’ Libya? The
    Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy,” International
    Security, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Winter 2005/06), pp. 47–86.

  3. William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and the End of the Cold War,” International
    Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 91–129.

  4. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and
    Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987).

  5. Christopher Layne discusses this subject particularly in the context of uni-
    polar systems. Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion”; John Ikenberry asks why no bal-
    ancing forces against the United States formed after the end of the Cold War. John
    G. Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, NY:
    Cornell University Press, 2002); Peter Turchin presents a mathematical formula
    for solving one of the major historical questions: the reasons for the rise and fall
    of great civilizations. Peter Turchin, Historical Dynamics: Why States Rise and Fall
    (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). Also see Peter Turchin, War and
    Peace and War: The Life Cycles of Imperial Nations (New York: Penguin Group, 2007);
    and Peter Turchin, War and Peace and War: The Rise and Fall of Empires (New York: A
    Plum Book, 2007).

  6. One of the main expectations of international relations theory is that it will
    be able to forecast the occurrence of significant events in the international scene.
    The end of the Cold War, for example, was not the first major event that surprised
    international relations researchers and will probably not be the last, but without
    doubt it is one of the most significant events that none of the main theories in
    the field, including the realistic theory, anticipated. William C. Wohlforth, “Reality
    Check: Revising Theories of International Politics in Response to the End of the
    Cold War,” World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 4 (July 1998), pp. 650–680, at p. 651.

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