Imperialism through Islamic Networks 37along the route, and pilgrims began to opt for sea routes between the Black and
Red seas, or chose to postpone their pilgrimage.
Nor was the decision to open Russia’s Damascus vice-consulate prompted by
problems hajj pilgrims were causing in Damascus, or concern about their activ-
ities in the city. In instructing Telatinidis to “maintain order” among Russian
hajj pilgrims, Bazili noted that he found them to be “generally peaceful and
well-behaved.”^59
Rather, the opening of Russia’s Damascus vice-consulate illustrated a shift in
policy in the Caucasus. By the early 1840s, faced with Muslim rebellions across
the North Caucasus that they could not suppress, Russian officials in the Cauca-
sus were increasingly concerned about the hajj. They had little sense of how
many Muslims in the Caucasus were making the pilgrimage, by which routes, or
who they were. Like European officials in other colonial contexts, many viewed
the hajj as a clandestine activity that fed Muslim “fanaticism,” and Mecca as a
center of anti-Christian proselytizing. Many believed that the hajj was fueling
Muslim anticolonial resistance in the Caucasus. Russian officials were especially
concerned about how returning hajj pilgrims might influence their communi-
ties. They understood that many elites made the pilgrimage, and that those bear-
ing the honorific title hajji (meaning, one who has completed the pilgrimage)
were accorded great respect in their communities and tended to be among those
chosen by Muslims to serve as their local political leaders. If these pilgrims were
getting radicalized on the hajj, then they might have an inordinate, radicalizing
influence over Muslim communities back home.^60
One proposed solution was to stop the flow of pilgrims abroad by making
passports prohibitively expensive. In 1842 Russia’s minister of war, A. I. Cherny-
shev, wanted to impose a steep fifty-ruble fee on all passports to Mecca, to reduce
the number of pilgrims. When this proved unpopular and unenforceable—Mus lims
complained that their religious freedom was being restricted, and the fee vio-
lated existing passport law—then commander in chief A. I. Neidgardt suggested
spying on Russia’s hajj pilgrims instead. In 1843, he proposed to Nesselrode, the
foreign minister, that Russia send one of its “trusted” Muslim officers in the Cau-
casus into Mecca as a “special agent,” who could keep the Russian administration
in the Caucasus informed about what pilgrims were doing in Mecca, and
whether foreign Muslims were trying to “instill” in them ideas that were “harm-
ful” to the tsarist government. Nesselrode agreed that it was “desirable” to post a
Russian agent in Mecca, but doubted that the Ottomans would allow Russia to
establish a presence in “a holy place for Muslims.”^61