Askêsis (ἄσκησις): exercise, practice, disciplined training designed to achieve virtue. Epictetus
sees three areas of training (Discourses 3.2.1–3a, 3.12.8)—the famous doctrine of three topics (topoi)
that scholars think was Epictetus’s unique contribution to late Stoicism (see Long’s Epictetus: A Stoic
and Socratic Guide to Life, pp. 112–118; Hadot’s The Inner Citadel, pp. 89–100). Before Epictetus,
Seneca affirms the long-standing Stoic division of philosophy into three parts, which he calls “the
moral, the natural, and the rational” (Moral Letters 89.9). Epictetus, we argue, also sees three levels
of discipline, moving from learning/study (μανθάνω/manthanô, appearing seventy-nine times) to
practice (μελετάω/meletaô, appearing fifty-four times; see Discourses 2.19.29–34, where he says
“learn and diligently practice”) to more rigorous training (ἀσκέω/ἄσκησις, appearing forty times).
For the three levels of discipline, see 2.9.13–14. For Epictetus, the exercise and training analogies run
from wrestling and athletics (see the “invincible athlete” in 1.18.21–23; “true athlete in rigorous
training” in 2.18.27–2), to the pankration (3.10.6–7), and the ultimate “hard winter training”
(χειμασκησαι/cheimaskêsai) of soldiers (1.2.32, 4.8.35–37). While each of these three areas of
training and three levels of discipline reach into and inform one another, there is a clear sense of
hierarchy in the acts of the soul, moving up from desire through action to assent, and of making
forward progress in our actions in the world, from study to practice to hard training, toward virtue
(see chart). For Marcus, who is often derisive of mere study, books, and displays of learning (2.2,
3.14, 5.5, 5.9), these words scarcely appear. He seems more interested in simply getting straight to
putting things to the test in everyday life by following the dictates of our guiding reason
(hêgemonikon). In this way he is very much in tune with Epictetus’s memorable admonition against
spouting what you’ve learned without having digested it (see Discourses 3.21.1–3). For Marcus, the
point of it all is to use our reason to produce in action the virtues of self-control, courage, justice, and
wisdom, which correlate to the topoi of Epictetus (see chart).
Ataraxia (ἀταραξία): tranquility, freedom from disturbance by external things. It is the fruit of
following philosophy, according to Epictetus (Discourses 2.1.21–22). It appears fourteen times in the
Discourses and twice in the Enchiridion; see Discourses 2.2 (Arrian’s caption of section), 2.18.28,
4.3.6b–8, and 4.6.34–35. It appears once in Marcus (9.31; not here).
Axia (ἀξία): the true value or worth of things; the relative value of things preferential; of
people, meaning reputation or what’s deserved. It appears eighteen times in Marcus; see 4.32, 5.1,
5.36, 9.1.1, and 12.1. Marcus quotes Epictetus on this concept in discussing how to use the power of
assent in the area of our impulses (11.37). For Epictetus, the term appears twenty-nine times in the
Discourses and twice in Enchiridion (36; not here). See Discourses 1.2.5–7, 4.1.170, 4.3.6–8, and
4.5.34–37. Overall, the idea is that we too often trade things of great value for things of very little
value, an idea that goes back to the teachings of Diogenes of Sinope, the founder of the Cynic school,
as described by Diogenes Laertius (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 6.2.35b).
Daimôn (δαίμων): divine spirit within humans; our individual genius. Chrysippus held that a
happy and well-flowing life was the result “when the affairs of life are in every way tuned to the
harmony between the individual divine spirit and the will of the director of the universe” (Lives of the
Eminent Philosophers 7.1.88). Epictetus tells us never to worry because we are never alone: God is
always within, as is our own daimôn (Discourses 1.14.14; not here).
Diairesis (διαίρεσις): analysis, division into parts. Used when distinguishing what is subject to our
power of choice from what is not.
Dianoia (διανοία): thought, intelligence, purpose, faculty of mind. Haines notes: “not affected by
the motions of the pneuma.”