54 L. Zingales, “WhatDetermines the Valueof Corporate
Votes?,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 4 (1995):
1047–1073.
55 T.Nenova,“TheValueofCorporateVotesandCorporate
Control:ACrossCountryAnalysis,”workingpaper,SSRN,
2000.
56 L.Zingales,“TheValueoftheVotingRight:AStudyof
theMilanStockExchangeExperience,”ReviewofFinancial
Studies1 (1994): 125–148.
57 N. Linciano, “Non-voting Shares and the Value of
Control: The Impact of Corporate Regulation in Italy,”
working paper, SSRN, 2002.
58 T. Nenova, “ControlValues and Changes in Corporate
Law in Brazil,” Working paper, SSRN, 2001.
59 Ofthe242.5millionvotingshares, 80 percentisequally
held by four entities—Cia Bozano, Previ, Sistel, and the
European Group. Effectively, they control the company.
60 TheBraziliangovernmentowns only0.8percent ofthe
votingsharesbutasignificantportionofEmbraer’scustomer
financing is provided by the Brazilian development bank
(BNDES), which also owns 9.6 percent of the non-voting
shares.
61 J. L. Coles, M. L. Lemmon, and L. Naveen, “A
ComparisonofProfitabilityandCEOTurnoverSensitivityin
Large Private and Public Firms,” working paper, SSRN,
2003.TheynotethattheCEOofaprivatefirmismuchmore