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commander, which eased the situation considerably. It was as clear a proof
as one could wish for of the importance of social and intellectual affinity in
the effective conduct of covert relationships, especially in the highly politi-
cized field of white and black propaganda.^45
But, aside from such challenges at the local, individual level, why was
the FO so often generally opposed to SOE’s attempts to mount opera-
tions? It seems to have been that the utmost secrecy in which SOE was
compelled to cloak its activities in Middle Eastern countries sometimes led
the FO to suspect that mutually agreed policies were not being adhered
to. The FO felt that prior consultation was essential, and such policy con-
sultations were normally undertaken; however, when approved projects
reached the implementation stage, the FO’s confidence in SOE often
seemed to vanish. Consequently, an agreement was entered into between
SOE and the FO which provided the latter with veto power over any SOE
activities in British-occupied countries like Iraq. Clearly, there could not
be two government departments both entitled to pursue independent for-
eign policies of their own without knowledge of what the other was doing.
Much of the opposition which SOE encountered was engendered by sus-
picions that they were evolving and pursuing not just approved plans, but
secret policies of their own.^46
The FO seemed to resent generally the presence in the Middle East of
any secret organization other than SIS, which it saw rightly or wrongly as
lodged firmly beneath its umbrella. With regard to the FO’s view of RAF
Air Intelligence, of SOE, and of Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME)/
CICI in Iraq, Priya Satia has mentioned (unusually without accurate cita-
tion) how the Defence Security Officer (DSO), Hanbury Dawson-
Shepherd, was criticized by the FO for his pessimism (‘can only look at
Iraqi matters through the darkest of dark glasses’), and how his periodic
CICI intelligence reports were described as ‘exaggerated and misleading’
(specifically by Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, though Satia does not name him).^47
In fact, in this context, Cornwallis was criticizing one specific report—not
CICI reports in general—and without naming Dawson-Shepherd as its
author. Of course, the ambassador was well aware that an ad hominem
attack would have been inappropriate, because Wood as a G1 and Dawson-
Shepherd as a G2 routinely signed reports that were actually written,
edited, and compiled by less senior officers at the lower G3, ALO, and
APA or DAPA levels. The document from which Satia is quoting (without
citation) is in fact Cornwallis’s indignant letter to Jumbo Wilson in
response to Security Intelligence Summary No. 48 of 21 December 1942,
SOUTH GATE