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camps, notwithstanding the fact that Edmonds was himself a Kurdish
expert. Fortunately, Cornwallis was an Arabist, so together the two men
were able to plot a relatively balanced political course that advanced FO
policy while seeking to harmonize the aspirations of Iraq’s majority and
minority groups. Their main challenge was the traditional antipathy
between Kurd and Arab. It was entrenched and extreme, and both the
ambassador and the chief political adviser found themselves trapped as
‘pigs in the middle’ between two bitter adversaries, both of whom claimed
to be pro-British. The Kurds implored the British to advocate for their
minority interests, hoping for ultimate autonomy, while the Sunni Arabs
who controlled the central government in Baghdad resisted every Kurdish
proposal and besought the British to remain firm. In practice of course,
FO policy always prevailed: the central Iraqi government had to be
appeased to prevent the nation falling apart. Unfortunately, the matter did
not end there, for the situation was complex, and many factors other than
the Kurdish question played into the security of Iraq. First, a world war
was raging beyond Iraq, and at least until 1943, the British were preoc-
cupied with their role in the greater conflict. Second, the Kurds were not
the only group at odds with the central Iraqi government. The British
were also inundated with requests to support the interests of the Assyrians
and the Yezidis in the north, and most importantly the majority Shias in
the south. None of these groups had supported the regime of Rashid Ali
and the Golden Square, nor were they at all impressed by the continued
employment of former Gaylani supporters within the ‘new’ post-Gaylani
power structure in Baghdad.^58
Beyond this, the Kurdish problem was in itself nuanced. As Iltyd
Clayton, the deputy director of military intelligence (DDMI) in Cairo,
wrote to Freya Stark in early 1942: ‘The Kurdish question bristles with
difficulties. I cannot see an independent Kurdish state existing. It sprawls
over so much country, and the Kurds in Kurdistan are as mixed up with
Persians, Lurs, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Turks that the ethnological
problems would be enormous. The most I see is a degree of autonomy
within the existing states: Turkey, Iraq, and Persia. Turkey is deeply suspi-
cious of any attempt on the part of the Kurds to realize any form of inde-
pendence and is, in the eyes of the Kurds, Public Enemy No. 1. The
Persian and Iraqi Kurds may, however, quite possibly settle down where
they are, provided they get a reasonable number of concessions to their
race—I won’t say nationality.’^59 It is some measure of the importance
attached by the British intelligence and security apparatus to the Kurdish