A NEW PHASE FROM MARCH ’69?In testimony before the Agranat Commission that was released only in 2012, Maj.-
Gen. Avraham Adan confirmed that the Eg yptian raids were “successful” in laying
ambushes between the strongpoints, as the planned electronic warning system did not
work and manned lookouts were gradually discontinued. Several strongpoints
were blown up by the Eg yptians. They were just before completion in March [1969 and]
... were abandoned by the IDF because of the shelling. The Eg yptians mined [them] and
backed up the mines with anti-tank fire from the other side. So tank patrols there were
stopped ... up to the ceasefire there were areas that were taboo [for us], that were not under
our control.^49When the ultimate Eg yptian offensive was launched, at least some of the soldiers in
every Eg yptian formation had already experienced a combat crossing, knew what
obstacles to expect, and were not intimidated by the mission or the enemy. The
Eg yptian Army’s history of the war attributes its success to this morale-boosting prac-
tice in steadily growing formations—as usual, with no mention of the Soviet input.^50
The Israelis did credit the Soviets, at least in retrospect—no doubt partly to excuse their
own initial setback in the Yom Kippur War. Briefing Kissinger sixteen days into the
fighting, MI (Military Intelligence) chief Maj.-Gen. Eliyahu Ze’ira pointed out that
“the enemy armies prepared for this war for four years, and every unit rehearsed its
mission countless times. ... The Soviets’ influence is [also] very evident in improving
confidence, communications, eavesdropping capability on the IDF, electronic warfare
and deception.”^51
One of the weapons that Lashchenko had recommended supplying to Eg ypt was
now delivered and soon made its debut. A team of four Soviet instructors arrived in
the summer of 1969 to introduce the Malyutka (Sagger) shoulder-fired anti-tank
rocket.^52 The Israelis identified its first launch on 7 July 1970, when the lead Israeli
tank in a convoy evaded the missile but it struck the following tank, causing little
damage. In November 1970, however, an Israeli tank was first destroyed by a Sagger.^53
The shock that would be inflicted by this weapon’s devastating success against Israeli
armor in October 1973 could hardly be attributed to unfamiliarity. More than forty
years later, it was still cited by an Israeli general as an example of the surprise caused
by a threat that was not unknown but not properly evaluated.^54
In the short term, however, Serkov noted only a slow improvement in his podsovi-
etnye’s ability to carry out routine staff work.
Combat fire [is being drilled] now at platoon and company level, crossing exercises for
battalions. ... Our demands have become more brazen. No room for diplomacy. Sometimes
there’s a feeling of incompetence when our efforts yield no return. ... There are officers who
do not believe in their own capacities, in victory. They start up with talk that we are already
fed up with—that the USSR is giving them only little materiel, and it too is unsuited for
desert conditions, etc. Apparently they often talk so among themselves in order to justify
the low level of their forces’ preparedness and their own fecklessness. ... There’s no use even