THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973However, when Sadat (by then president) signed, in May 1971, a five-year Friendship
and Cooperation Treaty with the USSR, Western analysts were surprised to note that
“the provisions of the treaty bore a remarkable resemblance to those of treaties
between the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations.”^6
Furthermore, according to Yaremenko, Nasser insisted that the entry of Soviet
forces be overt:
At worst, it could be explained to the world that only volunteers were involved. Brezhnev
opposed this, arguing that no one would believe the Soviet leadership because it was
impossible that so many volunteers could be recruited in a few days for a war in a foreign
country. Finally it was agreed that the operation would be top secret and without unneces-
sary “noise” [which does conform to Heikal’s account of Brezhnev’s position].^7B. The back-channel reports cast further doubt on “Nasser’s visit”
On 10 February 1970, Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin took up Kosygin’s mes-
sage in the confidential back channel. In his memoirs, Kissinger maintained that he
warned the Soviets against making good on the premier’s threat by inserting troops
into Eg ypt.^8 Writing in 1992, David Korn, then of the US Embassy in Israel, found
no record or recollection that Kissinger had informed the State Department of such
a warning. But presumably because keeping the diplomats in the dark was par for the
course, Korn concluded: “Whether Kissinger did actually foresee” the Soviet move
“and to what extent he in fact acted to try to prevent this, will only be known once
the archives are opened.”^9
The reports by both back-channel protagonists are now available, and just as
expected it depends whom one believes. Both of the interlocutors attest that despite
Kosygin’s threat ten days before, they discussed only a theoretical prospect of Soviet
servicemen being deployed to Eg ypt. No visit by Nasser to Moscow was so much as
mentioned. Dobrynin disclosed no Politburo resolution authorizing a direct inter-
vention—let alone that it was already well under way. Kissinger did report to Nixon
that he had warned “the introduction of Soviet combat personnel to the Middle East
would be viewed with the gravest concern ... we want to make sure that the Soviet
leaders are under no misapprehension about the possibility of grave consequences.”
Dobrynin, he noted, “was extremely affable. ... He wanted to assure me that the
Soviet leaders had no intention of exacerbating tensions.”^10 The Soviet ambassador,
for his part, wrote home that “Kissinger did not explicitly say they are concerned
about the direct participation of our military in combat operations,” but nonetheless
Kissinger “made it clear that this is primarily and precisely the crux of the matter.”
Commenting to Moscow, Dobrynin did not foresee better progress with Kissinger
than with Sisco toward a settlement, and suggested “to exploit to a somewhat greater
extent ... the paragraph of A.N. Kosygin’s message that made Nixon uneasy.” The
president, he opined, wanted only to prevent direct Soviet involvement while out-