THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973improvised positions. Speed and mobility, which the Soviet advisers had been drilling
with the Eg yptians for almost three years, were now essential. This new method
involved considerable risk, Smirnov noted, and “demanded outstanding coolheaded-
ness as well as moral and psychological preparation. ... The commander had to be
certain that his manpower and equipment alike would function, otherwise the enemy
might strike [our] divizyon itself, which would result in death of personnel and loss
of hardware.”^16 Both the Soviet and Eg yptian batteries did suffer losses, but their
aggressive tactics paid off.
The Israelis quickly felt the change. “Recently the Eg yptians have been trying to
infiltrate missiles into the canal zone at night. ... They prepare them for operation by
‘primitive’ methods, as they cannot operate complete electronic systems. Then, they fire
at IAF planes.” Hours after the IAF detected this innovation on 30 June, the Soviet-
manned SAMs claimed their first Israeli F-4—the second of two that Israel confirmed
lost that day to “Soviet-advised Eg yptian” SAMs.^17 The first Phantom was indeed
downed by Eg yptian SAM-2s. Its pilot was the one who had caused the 18 April inci-
dent with his slow flight home. He and his WSO were now captured. The second
Phantom, also struck by two SAM-2s, was finished off by a Soviet SAM-3. Smirnov
cautiously—and unusually for the Soviets—took credit only for the latter success, for
which his outfit had physical evidence: a helmet attributed to the pilot of the first
Phantom shot down by the Soviets is kept in the Russian Air Defense Corps museum.^18
This, however, is when Smirnov noted that some colleagues had gone on record
with wilder claims, which were reflected immediately in the Moscow talks. Heikal
reported in Al-Ahram that on 1 July, Nasser told the Soviet troika that four Phantoms
had been downed the day before. “His remark caused great surprise. After a moment
of silence, Grechko said: ‘no, Mr President. According to our information, six planes
were shot down yesterday.” The defense minister pointed out the sites on a map.^19
Even according to Smirnov’s modest version, 30 June was of immense significance to
the Soviets’ morale as well as their operational doctrine: “these new tactics proved
themselves. The first Phantom was shot down by the first missile that Capt. Valeryanos
Prano Malyauka’s divizyon launched.” A political officer went further in Malyauka’s
praise: “after identifying the target, the captain did not betray his excitement to his
subordinates but continued to issue orders as clearly and confidently as in training.”
After seeing that the pencil of a staff officer, Lt Gurov, was rattling on the plotting table,
“he said: ‘calm down, comrades, relax, we’ll have a shootdown right away.’” He held up
the missile launch until the last moment, Gurov recalled, “and we were all gripped by
fear: why don’t we shoot? Only after the commander’s calm order was given ... we
understood: the enemy was thus denied the time for evasive action.”^20 Smirnov summed
up the day: “this first Israeli Phantom—one of those American-made super-aircraft,
whose invincibility was legendary—fell on Eg yptian soil. ... To learn from the experi-
ence of this successful first engagement, that very night all divizyon commanders as well
as missile-guidance and radar officers were assembled in Malyauka’s divizyon.”^21