THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973At an IAF gathering just before the ceasefire, Hod “squirmed” when Dayan
demanded that he “propose a solution to overcome these missiles.”^6 The defense min-
ister was so apprehensive of a SAM advance that once Israel had accepted the Rogers
Plan—which brought down its national-unity governing coalition—he tried to put
the ceasefire into effect as quickly as possible, while the Soviets and Eg yptians tem-
porized. Meeting the US ambassador on Friday, 7 August, Dayan pressed Barbour to
apply the ceasefire immediately so as to prevent a last-minute advance of the missiles.
The truce was finally declared only a few hours ahead of its entry into effect at mid-
night—so late that Israel’s weekend papers did not report it.^7
Despite its hasty finalization, the ceasefire had been under discussion for months
and the standstill provision for weeks, with mounting US suspicion as to the Soviet
and Eg yptian commitment to observe it. Still, as the director of the US National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) admitted, “we did not have a good baseline on Soviet-
provided emplacements in Eg ypt.”^8
How could this have happened? Although he had left the negotiation of the cease-
fire itself to Rogers, Kissinger involved his own National Security Council (NSC) in
setting up the verification procedures—perhaps to ensure the plan’s success, but just
as plausibly to blame the State Department and its chief for a predictable failure
(which he and Nixon indeed went on to do).^9 The tangled chains of command
resulted finally in no monitoring at all when it counted.
Intelligence historian Norman Polmar credits Kissinger for initiating surveillance
of the canal area and asking first for satellite photography. But a satellite was tasked
only for 10 August—which had been the target date during the last phase of the
ceasefire talks.^10 The satellite use evidently was not (and probably could not have
been) rescheduled when the ceasefire was brought forward at the last minute. At any
rate, satellite imagery did not have adequate resolution for identifying individual
vehicles or emplacements, and the Israelis objected to exclusive reliance upon it.^11 In
response, the Americans floated an “open skies” proposal whereby each side could
send unarmed observation sorties over the other’s front lines. When that was rejected,
it was replaced with “mutual verification” by each side’s planes peering diagonally
across the canal. Neither the mode of observation nor how complaints were to be
adjudicated was adequately clarified.
Kissinger, meanwhile, approached the US Air Force for U-2 reconnaissance flights,
but the USAF estimated that providing them would take several weeks. CIA Director
Richard Helms stepped in and promised at an NSC meeting to mount such flights
within one week of activation. Ambassador Beam in Moscow was advised to inform
the Soviets of “our government’s intention to police [the ceasefire] unilaterally by US
observation flights. ... Foreseeing trouble, I suggested that this mission be given to the
British, who had bases in the area and who wished to play some part in peacekeeping.
This proposal was turned down.”^12