THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973in May 1967 for at least two sorties from Eg ypt over Israel that were designed for
provocation no less than reconnaissance.^3
There have been retrospective suggestions that selling MiG-25s to Eg ypt, or at least
restationing them there with Soviet crews, was demanded by Cairo, envisaged by
Moscow, and even implemented from the outset of Kavkaz or earlier. United Press
International (UPI) reported on 30 November 1968 that in response to the finaliza-
tion of Israel’s Phantom purchase, “the Soviet Union ... began delivering 200 ‘MiG-
23s’ to Eg ypt. The MiGs were capable of carrying nuclear weapons and were more
maneuverable than Phantoms.”^4 A similar but more plausible report actually appeared
in Time magazine before Johnson’s announcement, stating that the 200 planes were
to include MiG-21s and “23s.” Israeli commentator Chaim Herzog correctly pointed
out that the USSR had very few of the latter. Besides the confused appellation, the
model’s specifications were described very inaccurately.^5 According to Heikal’s version
of the commitments that Nasser received in Moscow in January 1970, the MiG-21
squadrons were to be “preceded by four high-altitude supersonic reconnaissance
planes ... the West now knows them as MiG-25s.”^6 Kavkaz staff officer Abramov
confirms that this was included in the agreement to launch the operation.^7
On 14 February 1970, Nasser told the New York Times’ James Reston that he “is
pressing the Soviet Union for ‘MiG-23’ fighter planes ... to intercept the Israeli bomb-
ers,” mentioning the option of “Soviet pilots.”^8 Soviet Foreign Ministry officials denied
this to Ambassador Beam.^9 But following Kissinger’s rude awakening by the Soviet
regulars’ appearance in Eg ypt, Ambassador reported that Washington was less con-
cerned about the SAM-3s than about their Soviet crews—and about the possible
“introduction of Soviet pilots to fly the latest ‘MiG-23’ aircraft.” He suggested that
Moscow could use the issue to put pressure on Washington, which is exactly how the
Foxbats’ deployment was viewed when it became known, and permanent, a year later.^10
V. Vinogradov, Soviet ambassador in Cairo, includes “MiG-25 aircraft ... with Soviet
crews” in the air defense division whose arrival “sobered up not only the Israelis but also
the Americans,” implying that this brought about the ceasefire in August 1970.^11 Before
Katyshkin’s tour of duty in Eg ypt ended in September of that year, according to his
colleague and biographer he “would frequently visit the deployment sites of Air Force
personnel in Eg ypt in missile-bearing MiG-25 bombers, which for camouflage were
referred to as M-500.”^12
A continuous Foxbat presence in Eg ypt this early seems unlikely, as the still-exper-
imental model had suffered a major setback in April 1969 when an engine failure cost
the life of the Air Defense Corps’ aviation arm commander, Gen. Anatoly Kadomtsev,
and the problem was still being addressed. The craft may have been sent to Eg ypt for
short-term field trials combined with specific operational missions, just as it was in
May 1967. According to Russian aviation writer Viktor Markovsky, based on inter-
views with “participants,” this was precisely the purpose of an initiative by the deputy
minister for the aviation industry, A.V. Minayev, who had been one of the MiG-25’s