SADAT PROVES HIS STABILITY AND LOYALTYdesigners. He suggested such trials in Eg ypt in “the summer of 1970,” but implemen-
tation was delayed by the uncertainty following Nasser’s death and resumed once
Sadat confirmed the continuity of Eg ypt’s policy.^13 The senior test pilot Bezhevets,
who led the project from 1963 and would command the Foxbats in Eg ypt, has also
related that “formation of the team for Eg ypt began in mid-June 1970” but was for-
malized only later.^14 The test pilot Aleksandr Lysenko is described as serving “from
December 1970 ... in combat activity in Eg ypt ... in a MiG-25 aircraft.”^15
B. Soviet doubts about Sadat dispelled
Even if a continuous MiG-25 presence would be established only in mid-1971, these
preliminaries attest that there was only a brief suspension, if any, of Soviet military
involvement due to uncertainty about Nasser’s succession. Speaking in the post-
Soviet 1990s, Akopov claimed that following Sadat’s accession there already were
Soviet views that “he is not our man—he is looking at the West.” But the Soviet
embassy staffer himself felt that the differences were mainly over Sadat’s demands for
economic aid that the USSR could not meet rather than over policy goals, and that
agreement could be reached.^16 Sadat did put out first feelers toward US emissaries as
early as Nasser’s funeral, and entertained a series of senior American guests over the
following six months—but any qualms the Soviets had about him were soon dis-
pelled. His consultations with Kosygin’s delegation to the funeral, as already cited,
betrayed little dissent.
Among other reassuring moves, Sadat immediately reinstated the reputedly pro-
Soviet Ahmed Ismail, though for now at a lower but politically influential post as
chief of intelligence.^17 Sadat’s rival and the Soviets’ reputed favorite, Sabry, was kept
on as vice-president and liaison with Moscow. If there was any discord, it was only
over Sadat’s overenthusiasm to praise and flaunt the Soviets’ direct military involve-
ment beyond what Moscow intended to disclose. A case in point was Sadat’s speech
at Tanta in January 1971, which the Soviet embassy reportedly hastened—and had
sufficient clout—to suppress.^18
In the military, reliance on the Soviet advisers was if anything stepped up: ahead
of a conference on 30 December 1970 to “analyze the results of recent combat opera-
tions, Eg yptian air defense formation commanders were instructed to avail them-
selves of assistance by the Soviet advisers in preparing reports and lectures.”^19
Instructors from Soviet military academies organized study courses for senior
Eg yptian officers, such as Navy commander Fahmy who completed a thesis on desant
(landing ) operations (like Kapitanets’s own, and under the same supervisor). A joint
exercise of such landings, which Kapitanets and the chief naval adviser, Vice-Admiral
Grigory Chernobay, had planned with Fahmy in early September, went ahead after
Nasser’s death. “On the surface nothing changed,” Kapitanets wrote in retrospect.
Nasser’s approval for Eskadra ships to enter all Eg yptian ports was not rescinded.^20