THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973C. Ceasefire-extension brinkmanship
Sadat, once established in power, declared 1971 to be “the year of decision,” and
received full Soviet support in threatening war. The first ninety-day extension of the
ceasefire was about to expire on 5 February. In the month preceding the deadline,
there was intensive consultation between Cairo and Moscow. Sabry returned from a
periodic visit to the USSR with promises of “unlimited military and political support
for Eg ypt ... in its struggle against the United States and Israel.”^21
Sadat now transmitted to Washington through a “private channel” a proposal to
open the canal after only a partial Israeli withdrawal. A month later, he would take
care to assure Donald Bergus of the US interests section in Cairo “that his proposal
was not in any sense a Cold War exercise. There had been no Soviet pressure on him.”
Overtly, Sadat declared that Eg ypt was ready for war, and issued an ultimatum for
Israel to make a “positive step” as a condition for extending the ceasefire again. Israel,
under heavy US duress, had already reluctantly agreed on 28 December to restart the
Jarring talks. But Sadat soon clarified that this would not suffice. He “felt Jarring
would not get anywhere and would take a long time doing so.”^22
In mid-January, Soviet head of state Nikolay Podgorny returned to Eg ypt, osten-
sibly for the festive inauguration of the Aswan Dam. However, he used this and other
public opportunities to pledge support for another war with Israel. He told a cheer-
ing crowd of 5,000 shipyard workers in Alexandria that the USSR would “bear any
material losses to help Eg ypt repulse Israel. We will furnish you with experts and
money to enable you to achieve your aims.” Sadat replied that Eg ypt “will be a faith-
ful friend.”^23 As the ceasefire expiry approached, the EAF resumed daily flights over
the east bank of the canal, backed by electronic-warfare coverage from Soviet planes
in Eg yptian airspace. Israel complained to the UN observers that this violated the
ceasefire but did not attempt interception, despite increasing fears of an imminent
Eg yptian–Soviet offensive.^24 During such incursions on 26 April (by a MiG-21) and
9 May (by two Su-7s), Israeli ground positions did open fire, but the intruders were
not hit, the incidents drew little attention, and the flights continued.^25
A week before the ceasefire extension was due to expire on 5 February, Dobrynin
reminded Kissinger that no response had been received to Soviet proposals for gen-
eral principles of a settlement. “Kissinger assured me that Nixon wants to resume the
bilateral confidential dialogue ... but ... did not say anything more specific”—except
that “a reliable and reputable Eg yptian source ‘had confidentially informed’” the
Americans that opening the canal might be acceptable without a final settlement, but
with a mutual 30–40 kilometer pullback of forces except for the SAMs”—a crucial
element that Bergus had not mentioned.
Kissinger asked Dobrynin to verify this with Eg ypt. Dobrynin replied that he had
heard nothing except for a similar Israeli proposal attributed to Dayan, which was
rejected in Eg ypt as it included no commitment for an ultimate full withdrawal. But