THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973of the Soviet military preparations in Eg ypt ... now complete in almost every detail
... for a Soviet-supported crossing of the Suez Canal by the Eg yptians.” This meant
“important people in Moscow were thinking very seriously about winning the whole
Middle East by beating the Israelis to their knees, or crushing Israel altogether.”^33
This alarmist view of Soviet acquiescence in, if not support for, total eradication
of Israel was also gaining ground in Israel itself, due to Sadat’s new Palestinian-related
conditions. This elicited calls for a preemptive strike as in June 1967. But there is little
evidence to indicate that in early 1971 the Soviets, or indeed Sadat, were on the brink
of launching even a limited cross-canal offensive; their preparations were for the
longer range. The ostentatious declarations contrasted sharply with the stealth and
secrecy that would precede the ultimate attack in October 1973, and more resembled
the intentional provocation of Israel to strike first in May 1967—as illustrated by the
military moves that were soon to follow.
D. The agreed Soviet handover to Eg yptians begins
A week before the new ceasefire expiry date on 5 March, Sadat arrived in Moscow for
his first visit as president. A week earlier, Dobrynin reported that “the central objec-
tive of American policy in the Middle East remains ... above all else to ‘eliminate’
Soviet military presence there”—again a clear reflection of Kissinger’s “indiscretion.”
He suggested skillful and deliberate use of “threatening various actions ... in the
military-political realm. ... This is a very effective means for influencing the White
House.”^34 His advice was evidently followed. On the eve of Sadat’s arrival, the Soviet
press bannered a government statement supporting the Eg yptian proposals and cas-
tigating the United States for failing to press Israel to accept them.^35
Like Nasser’s real or fictitious trip a year before, Sadat’s “secret” visit became common
knowledge within a few days, and US officials claimed a week later that they had known
about it in advance.^36 But when Sadat announced on 7 March that Eg ypt would no
longer be bound by the ceasefire, Dobrynin reported, with evident satisfaction, that the
decision came as an “unpleasant surprise for the Nixon administration.”^37 Kissinger had
just a few days earlier treated a ceasefire extension as a foregone conclusion, now that
“we could be on the verge of getting a real Eg yptian–Israeli negotiation started.” He
considered this also an opportunity to approach the USSR “on the question of remov-
ing their combat forces from the UAR if there is a peace agreement.”^38 Just the day before
Sadat’s statement, Nixon had agreed with Kissinger to “go for the partial solution,” and
they both considered that this would “give the Russians an added incentive for the
Summit”—now the White House’s premier objective.^39
So the national security adviser was blindsided again, and the Soviets’ military
follow-up soon gave Democratic hawks good reason to judge that Sadat’s Moscow
visit was a repeat performance of Nasser’s, “which led to the reinforcement of Soviet
missiles, forces and tanks in Eg ypt.” Sen. Henry Jackson charged “the USSR is run-