SADAT PROVES HIS STABILITY AND LOYALTYthough he expected nothing from Kissinger except “general phrases and assertions,”
Dobrynin suggested encouraging the White House to play a more active role, in
order “to exploit the advantage of [Nixon’s] interest in the summit.”^26 For the Soviets,
the State Department’s utility had been maximized, and there was now more to be
gained by switching tracks. Kissinger reported only inquiring about the “Dayan
plan’s” acceptability to Moscow, adding “I had reason to believe ... Cairo was inter-
ested (I was thinking of the [Amin?] Channel).”^27
Sadat waited until the last moment before extending the ceasefire—this time for
only thirty days. On the same day (4 February), he sent the Soviet leadership a mes-
sage calling for a “forceful riposte to the unholy alliance of the enemies of progress,
liberty and peace.”^28 But sidestepping Jarring on the very day that the UN envoy
submitted questionnaires to both sides, Sadat also went public with his new settle-
ment proposal in a celebrated interview for a US magazine.^29 This appeared to be an
abrupt change: in his previous talk with a US correspondent at the end of December,
Sadat had been unwilling to make the “concessions Israel wants in order to withdraw
Israeli troops from Eg yptian soil,” and the interviewer concluded that he was merely
saying “terrible things in a much nicer way” than Nasser.^30
Bergus in Cairo had to profess “surprise” at Sadat’s move—for “local [US] con-
sumption,” as he explained to Heikal, who now added the sweetener of resuming
diplomatic relations with Washington if the deal went through.^31 Sadat’s proposal
would be remembered mainly for the offer to open the canal after only a partial Israeli
withdrawal, but to the usual Eg yptian demand for prior commitment to withdraw
from all Eg yptian territory, he now added the West Bank too, as well as return of
Palestinian refugees. These elements had also by now been adopted by Soviet policy.
A partial settlement on the canal had been broached by Dayan in one of his frequent
turnarounds. But the new elements were non-starters for Israel’s cabinet, which was
now faced with a strident opposition after its right-wing component walked out to
protest the ceasefire and the acceptance of the Rogers Plan.
In Washington, it was assumed that the Soviets had connived with Sadat’s move,
but still it was taken as a retreat achieved by Rogers’s continuing efforts, and Israel
came under increasing US pressure to reciprocate. “The Soviets have ‘blinked’ percep-
tibly in the Middle East,” columnist Joseph Alsop was told. “There can be no doubt
whatever that Sadat’s offer was Soviet-inspired, and perhaps even Soviet-imposed”
due to greater Soviet interest than Eg ypt’s in opening the canal.
This was also the view of the US Embassy in Moscow. Reporting it to Kissinger,
NSC staffer Saunders still held that US initiative leading to the ceasefire had scored
a positive change by putting the focus on the Jarring talks “with the US as a not-too-
veiled prime mover behind them. The USSR (except for the standstill violations) has
been left in the wings.”^32 The perceived diplomatic gain thus overshadowed the very
real military setback. Not all in Washington agreed. Alsop’s sources considered that
two years of quiet could be foreseen. But he stressed “the terrible potential meaning