THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973before, Primakov denied any knowledge and countered, “we have our positions in
Eg ypt and frankly speaking, we can’t give up all this.” Dayan’s response was as tough
as Meir’s: “if this continues—we must either retreat from [the] canal or defend our-
selves in [the] air. We have no choice but the latter alternative.”
There was little more progress on political issues. Pressed by Dayan about Eg yptian
readiness for any amendment of the pre-1967 border, Primakov said he could not speak
for Sadat. When asked for the Soviets’ own position, he obfuscated so effectively that
the Israeli transcriber noted in the margin: “listen to this passage again.” Primakov did
suggest superpower guarantees for Israel after a full withdrawal (Dinitz, sitting in on the
talk, noted that he had asked Meir about the same option). In response, Dayan returned
to the Soviet military presence: “had it not been for your pilots there, your installations
there, we wouldn’t have to be worried about our security.” Any expectations that Dayan
might break ranks with Meir were dashed, and Primakov left Israel with little but a
vague agreement to continue mid-level meetings.
A week later, in a letter to Nixon on 7 September 1971, Brezhnev still linked the
summit in Moscow, which had just been agreed upon, with progress on the Middle
East (“a region directly adjoining ... the Soviet Union”) as well as Indochina. In par-
ticular, Brezhnev accused the United States of “losing interest” in an agreed settle-
ment. “Can this leave Soviet–American relations unaffected? Obviously, not.” Public
announcement of the summit was postponed by another month.^40